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The Fourth Amendment is generally seen as a procedural provision blind to a
defendant’s conduct in a given case, distinguished on that very ground from the Supreme
Court’s frequently moralistic assessment of conduct in its due process privacy caselaw. Yet
ever since the Court recentered Fourth Amendment protections around an individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy, it has consistently tied those protections to the nature
and, specifically, the social value of the activities involved. As in its substantive due
process cases, the Court frequently allots Fourth Amendment privacy interests based on
its moral evaluation of private acts, privileging conventional social goods like domesticity,
romantic relations, and meaningful emotional bonds. And in some cases—most notably
those involving aerial surveillance, home visitors, and drug testing—the Court has
adopted an expressly retrospective analysis, tying Fourth Amendment rights to a
defendant’s actual conduct at the time of a search.
This unrecognized strain of moralism in the Fourth Amendment is a troubling
development, unmoored from the Amendment’s text, hostile to its well-documented
history, and obstructive of its practical operation in regulating police abuses. Not least,
that moralistic approach upends prevailing understandings of privacy, as a refuge from
the pressures and expectations of society. Especially in the electronic age, as digital
technologies vastly expand the police’s ability to parse categories of private data, the
Court must cabin its moralistic turn, restoring a richer view of Fourth Amendment
values as encompassing individualistic and unorthodox pursuits. This Article identifies
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two immediate steps for moving forward: renouncing the Court’s privileging of
“intimate” over impersonal conduct and reconsidering the controversial binary-search
doctrine gleaned from the Court’s drug-testing cases. More fundamentally, it joins an
ongoing debate about the adequacy of the Court’s privacy-based Fourth Amendment
framework, suggesting both the importance and the difficulty of restoring a Fourth
Amendment attuned to liberal values of individualism and moral autonomy.
Finally, this Article addresses what the surprising rise of Fourth Amendment
moralism suggests about constitutional privacy rights more broadly. Belying the value
of privacy as a sanctuary from social judgment, the Court’s persistently moralistic
jurisprudence challenges the extent to which our Constitution has ever protected, and
perhaps can ever protect, a robust right of “privacy” as such.
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INTRODUCTION
In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis famously defended the “right to
be let alone” as a servant of “man’s spiritual nature,” his “intellect,” his “emotions”
and “beliefs.”1 The value of privacy, by this view, was a function of a person’s
moral and intellectual autonomy: his right to live his own life in his own way.2
Since then, the Supreme Court’s visions of privacy have often diverged from
that liberal path. At least in its substantive privacy jurisprudence, the Court in the
past five decades has struggled between two conflicting approaches—what may
best be seen as diametric conceptions of the relationship between privacy and moral
judgment. In one model, embodied in substantive due process and First
Amendment cases like Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey3 and
Stanley v. Georgia,4 the Court has envisioned “privacy” as a shield against moral
judgment: a zone where individuals may engage in activities considered devoid of
value, and thereby subject to regulation in other spheres. In the other, exemplified
by cases like Griswold v. Connecticut5 and Bowers v. Hardwick,6 it has envisioned
privacy as a privilege bestowed upon certain activities precisely because they are
socially valuable: a reward for doing something of established moral worth.
We do not typically think of the Fourth Amendment as part of this debate.
A procedural provision curbing the state’s power to watch private activities
rather than to regulate them,7 the Fourth Amendment is ostensibly blind to the
legality, much less the morality, of a defendant’s conduct.8 A “critical” difference
1
2

277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Brandeis’s liberal vision is often credited as the bedrock of constitutional privacy rights. See, e.g., Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (crediting Brandeis for establishing the
“groundwork” for the right to privacy); William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737,
772 (1995) (“[T]he origin of modern constitutional privacy law is to be found in a passage Justice Louis
Brandeis included in his 1928 dissent in Olmstead . . . .”); Mark John Kappelhoff, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There
A Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 487, 491 (1988) (crediting Brandeis with laying “a firm foundation” for
“a constitutionally based right to privacy”); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2010) (arguing that Brandeis “introduced modern concepts of privacy into
constitutional law”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1101 (2002) (noting
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent had a “profound impact” on Fourth Amendment and due process privacy law).
3 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992).
4 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
5 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
6 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7 See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness”, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1666 (1998) (characterizing Fourth Amendment privacy as barring “direct
perception of individuals’ . . . activities”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,
740 (1989) (arguing that Fourth Amendment privacy limits the state’s ability “to gain . . . information”
rather than “immunizing certain conduct . . . from state proscription”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s
Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1021-25 (1995) (characterizing
Fourth Amendment “privacy” as the right to keep information secret from the government).
8 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (noting that the Fourth Amendment
applies to “the innocent and guilty alike”).
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between Fourth Amendment and due process privacy, scholars have insisted, is
that the Fourth Amendment “make[s] the claimant’s substantive conduct
irrelevant” to its analysis.9 This is not to deny that the Fourth Amendment is,
in its own way, deeply normative. As a matter of black-letter doctrine, evaluating
a defendant’s “reasonable” expectations of privacy entails subjective social
judgments.10 Yet this normative analysis is generally seen to address the nature
of the state itself: the proper scope of the criminal justice system, or the types
of police tactics we wish to sanction in a democracy.11 In that, it might endorse
certain norms of how citizens living in an orderly society interact with agents of
the state.12 But it does not parse how citizens behave by or among themselves.
This Article argues that such conventional readings miss a persistent strain
in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over the past five decades.
Ever since the Court in Katz v. United States recentered the Fourth Amendment
around an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy,13 its analysis of
Fourth Amendment rights has increasingly come to hang on the nature and,
specifically, the social value of a defendant’s conduct at the time of a search.
Echoing the same moral hierarchy as in its substantive due process cases, the
Court has frequently tied Fourth Amendment privacy rights to the activities
implicated in a given case, privileging conventional social goods like
domesticity, romantic relations, and meaningful interpersonal bonds. And in
some cases—most notably those involving aerial surveillance, home visitors,
and drug testing—the Court has adopted an expressly retrospective analysis,
examining not just the typical uses associated with a space but the defendant’s
actual conduct during a police search. Granting greater protections to marital
embraces than marijuana plants, to social gatherings than business visits, to sexual
9 Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 749; see also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1510 (1996) (“Normally, the expectation
of privacy . . . must be described without reference to the criminal activity . . . disclosed . . . .”);
Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 704 n.52 (2015) (“[I]t
is well established that the type of information at issue in a search is irrelevant to the Katz test.”).
10 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974)
(identifying the inquiry into Fourth Amendment reasonableness as “plainly” entailing a “value judgment”);
Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 867 (2014) (characterizing the
general command that courts examine social norms, rather than text or history, as a “moral” inquiry); Silas J.
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 28
n.39 (1988) (describing an inquiry into the reasonableness of privacy expectations as a “normative” inquiry).
11 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 403 (describing the normativity of the Fourth
Amendment as evaluating surveillance techniques in light of the “aims of a free and open society”);
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 769 (2012) (characterizing the
Fourth Amendment’s “moral” element as balancing police efficiency against individual security);
Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 89 (grounding the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
inquiry in the “community’s moral intuitions” about police action).
12 See Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 188 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 655,
662-70 (2018).
13 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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intimacy than drug use, the Court has measured an individual’s privacy interests
based on the social value of the particular acts for which privacy is claimed.
There is essentially no commentary on this trend of Fourth Amendment
moralism. Scholars have noted that Fourth Amendment doctrine has sometimes
privileged middle-class social and domestic arrangements,14 yet such critiques
tend to concern the distributive effects of categorical rules, drawn around broad
classes of spaces rather than a defendant’s actual activities there. Inversely, some
scholars have observed—not without controversy—that the Court sometimes
considers the information uncovered by the police in assessing the existence of a
search.15 Yet they typically characterize the Court’s analysis not as a matter of
moral judgment but as a shorthand for the expectations of privacy test itself:
ferreting out information that is “particularly private”16 or customarily inaccessible
to the public.17 Such scholars accept the Court’s retrospective analysis as an intuitive
proxy for the Katz test, ensuring greater protections for more “private” facts.18
This Article shows that the Court’s retrospective analysis of the facts disclosed
by a police search is more prevalent than commonly recognized—a trend that itself
challenges conventional understandings of the Fourth Amendment as blind to a
defendant’s conduct. But that analysis is not based on a tautological inquiry into
which facts are especially private. It reflects the Court’s substantive assessments of
the value of the activities disclosed, based on its views of desirable social
arrangements and private pursuits. As it has played out over the past five decades,
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches has not simply
regulated the boundaries of the police state, or secured the individual’s private life
against state intervention. It has itself functioned as a form of state intervention
into private life, endorsing and rewarding citizens’ personal life choices.
The rise of Fourth Amendment moralism is deeply troubling, and not just
because it exempts broad categories of police conduct from judicial review. The
14 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391, 401 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1270-72 (1999). See generally Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy A Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485 (2009).
15 See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 2, at 1372 (noting the “type of property or activity secreted” as a factor
in the Court’s analysis); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
512-15 (2007) (discussing a “private facts model” of Fourth Amendment privacy); Richard G. Wilkins,
Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1121-22
(1987) (discussing the “object of surveillance” as among the Court’s considerations); cf. Sherry F. Colb,
Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Exist, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1663, 1673 (2007) (noting that Fourth Amendment standing depends on an “ex post” analysis). But
see Skopek, supra note 9, at 706-07 (dismissing this argument as scholarly “confusion”).
16 Kerr, supra note 15, at 512.
17 See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1122-23.
18 Kerr, supra note 15, at 513-15; Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1080. For other scholars embracing Kerr’s
approach, see Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1308 n.77 (2012), Amanda M.
Rehling, Fourth Amendment Rights in a Rental Storage Unit Obtained with a Stolen Identity, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 913, 919 (2010), and R. Bruce Wells, The Fog of Cloud Computing, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 238 (2009).
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Court’s moralistic appraisal of an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy
squares poorly with any rigorous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
unmoored from its text, hostile to its well-documented history, and frequently
obstructive of its practical operation in regulating police tactics. Not least, the
Court’s moralistic approach upends prevailing understandings of privacy itself—a
value extolled, by Justice Brandeis and by generations since, as a sanctuary from
the scrutiny and expectations of the outside world. And it does so for often
negligible practical gains, approving police tactics that could be salvaged through
narrower means. Neither a natural outgrowth of the Fourth Amendment’s historic
emphasis on the home, nor even a symptom of Katz’s more recent emphasis on
privacy in search-and-seizure doctrine, the Court’s frequently moralistic reasoning
is an extrinsic and gratuitous restriction of Fourth Amendment rights.
Beyond simply recognizing the rise of Fourth Amendment moralism, we
must thus push courts to move beyond it, restoring a richer view of the Fourth
Amendment as protecting a broad realm of intellectual, expressive, and moral
autonomy. Adopting a less discriminating approach is especially urgent today,
as digital technologies stand poised to heighten the impact of the Court’s
moralistic precedent. By expanding the scope and sophistication of police
searches—empowering the police to harvest only pre-identified categories of
communications, for example, or to sift out only those exchanges that contain
evidence of crime—digital technologies threaten to exclude vast new quantities
of personal data from Fourth Amendment protection. To mitigate that risk, this
Article urges two immediate amendments to the Court’s reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine. First, the Court must renounce its emphasis on “intimacy”
at the heart of the Fourth Amendment, extending coequal protections to more
individualistic or unorthodox pursuits. Second, it must restore Fourth
Amendment protection for “binary searches,” which ostensibly reveal only
criminal guilt but in fact touch on far broader details of private life.
More fundamentally, and speculatively, this Article joins a line of scholars
who have questioned the basic adequacy of privacy as the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Particularly in light of our shifting cultural
norms surrounding private data, scholars have urged the Court to abandon
its privacy-based framework, proposing alternatives better suited to
protecting liberal values of autonomy, self-definition, and expressive freedom
in the digital age.19 The rise of Fourth Amendment moralism provides all the

19 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118-19 (2008) (suggesting that we
reframe Fourth Amendment protections around “a right of security”); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much
Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1113-14
(2014) (proposing to define privacy “as respect for a personal sphere” guarded against “public inspection and
regulation”); see also Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1068 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is best understood as
protecting against police coercion); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
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more reason to revisit the doctrine, revealing the extent to which Katz’s
commitment to protecting individual “privacy” interests has failed on its own
terms—even as that development questions the extent to which Katz’s failures
can be traced to the concept of privacy itself. The Court’s frequently moralistic
approach to Fourth Amendment privacy suggests both the importance and the
profound difficulty of restoring a truly liberal Fourth Amendment.
Before proceeding, two brief clarifications are in order. First, it is worth
specifying what I mean by “moralism” or “moral” value. Throughout this
Article, my references to moral reasoning essentially invoke the distinction
between liberal and communitarian political theories: those legal orders that
leave individuals to define their own views of virtue, versus those that endorse
substantive visions of human flourishing.20 Similar to traditional morals
regulations, the “moralistic judgment” driving the Court’s analysis consists of
substantive judgments about how individuals ought to live their lives. What
matters here is less the content of any particular judgment—whether, for
example, homosexual intimacy is socially valuable—than the underlying
premise that such judgments are a proper basis for legal rules.
The line between liberal and communitarian decisionmaking is of course
hardly rigid. As Charles Fried has noted, the Court’s most individualistic cases
may be seen to reflect “the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not
to . . . society.”21 Since liberal orders themselves entail choices among broad
principles of political morality, liberalism is not value-neutral22; inversely,
substantive decisionmaking may endorse voluntarist principles as the basis of
the good life.23 Yet there remains a distinction between systems of governance
that seek to impose comprehensive moral judgments about individual lifestyles
and those that make an inherently moral choice to leave such decisions to the
individual.24 It is that former model to which this Article refers.
Second, it is important not to overstate the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s moralistic turn. This Article argues that the Court has frequently
tied Fourth Amendment privacy interests to the moral value of a defendant’s
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994) (suggesting that we reorient
the Fourth Amendment around the principle of “reciprocal trust between the government and its citizens”).
20 For an overview of the traditional distinction between liberalism and communitarianism,
see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 8-11 (1996), C. F. Delaney, Introduction to
THE LIBERALISM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE, at vii-x (C. F. Delaney ed., 1994), and James E.
Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L. REV. 509, 513 (1997).
21 Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977).
22 See Alasdair MacIntyre, The Privatization of Good, 52 REV. POL. 344, 359 (1990); Michael J. Sandel,
Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 533-32 (1989).
23 See Fleming & McClain, supra note 20, at 531; Michael S. Moore, Sandelian Antiliberalism,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 542-43 (1989).
24 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 13 (1993); Jean L. Cohen, Redescribing Privacy,
3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43, 74-75 (1992); Jeffrey Reiman, Liberalism and Its Critics, 6 SOC. PHIL.
TODAY 217, 218 (1991).
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private conduct. In that, it examines how the Court has approached one particular
question—the initial definition of a Fourth Amendment “search”—under one
particular framework, the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy test. Many
Fourth Amendment decisions since Katz rely on rules established long before
that case injected “privacy” into the heart of the doctrine; in some instances,
indeed, the Court’s pre-Katz trespass-based approach provides a telling contrast
against the moralism of the post-Katz analysis. Tracing the Court’s moralistic
assessments of reasonable expectations of privacy, in short, is valuable less for
what it tells us about Fourth Amendment caselaw as a whole (which is, in any
case, remarkably fragmented and malleable) than for what it reveals about the
Court’s conception of privacy as a principle of constitutional analysis.
By the same token, I do not suggest that the moral value of a defendant’s
conduct is a deliberate or even a conscious consideration in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment cases. To the extent the Court’s jurisprudence since the 1960s
reflects any overt policy considerations, those motives are likely far more
pragmatic: the Court’s sympathy for particular police tactics, its desire to
circumscribe the exclusionary rule, the difficulties of drawing lines in
peripheral Fourth Amendment cases. Moralism is the tool by which the Court
achieves these ends, not the end in itself. Yet the instrumental character of
the Court’s moralistic analysis does not make that trend any less noteworthy,
nor less revelatory of the Court’s underlying commitments. Where the Court
chooses, when forced, to chart the contours of Fourth Amendment privacy
tells us a good deal about what the Court sees as the core purpose of the
Fourth Amendment—as well as, for that matter, of privacy itself.
Beyond Fourth Amendment doctrine, in this sense, the Court’s moralistic
approach raises a larger question—one more easily asked than answered in the
scope of this Article. Putting the Fourth Amendment in dialogue with the Court’s
broader jurisprudence of privacy does not simply unearth a counterintuitive
wrinkle in the Court’s search-and-seizure doctrine. It also demonstrates the sheer
pervasiveness of the Court’s moralistic visions of privacy, spilling out past its
substantive privacy doctrines into procedural provisions like the Fourth
Amendment.25 Belying the fundamental value of privacy as a refuge from social
scrutiny, the Court’s persistent habit of tying privacy rights to social approval for
an individual’s actions challenges the extent to which our constitutional system has
ever, despite the Court’s many proclamations, protected a robust right of privacy.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews conventional
understandings of the Fourth Amendment as a procedural provision blind to the
25 This Article thus takes up the call for greater crossanalysis between the Fourth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1993).
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defendant’s substantive conduct—one distinguished on that very ground from the
Court’s often-moralistic reasoning in its substantive privacy cases. Part II begins to
question this account. After identifying a core concern of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test as the social worth of private conduct pursued in a given
space, it traces how such conduct came to be evaluated on much the same metric
that undergirds the Court’s due process jurisprudence: interpersonal intimacy.
Culminating this analysis, Part III examines three areas of law where the Court has
explicitly tied Fourth Amendment rights to a retrospective analysis of the
defendant’s activities: aerial surveillance, home visitors, and drug tests.
Part IV turns to the repercussions of Fourth Amendment moralism.
Contextualizing this trend against the text, history, and internal operation of the
Fourth Amendment, as well as against prevailing understandings of “privacy” as a
social good, it critiques the Court’s moralistic analysis as a recent and extraneous
restriction of Fourth Amendment rights. Part V looks to next steps. After first
proposing two amendments to the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine, it joins a broader debate about the utility of privacy as the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Finally, the Conclusion reflects briefly on what Katz’s
moralistic turn tells us about constitutional privacy rights beyond the Fourth
Amendment. Despite the Court’s frequent exaltation of privacy as “one of the
unique values of our civilization,”26 the Court’s pervasively moralistic visions of
privacy challenge the extent to which our constitutional system has protected—and
perhaps can ever protect—a right of privacy that we would recognize as such.
I. TWO MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
It is hardly novel to discuss the role of morality in the Supreme Court’s
constitutional privacy cases. From the species of First Amendment privacy
recognized in Stanley v. Georgia27 to the marital privilege announced in
Griswold v. Connecticut,28 the Court’s substantive privacy jurisprudence over
the past five decades has featured a struggle over the normative content of
constitutional rights: whether any constitutional entitlement of “privacy”
protects only conduct “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”29
or whether it defends an individual’s autonomy against moral convention.
That struggle has emerged, sometimes more and sometimes less explicitly,

26 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); see also Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)) (“The security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a free society.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (describing the principle of privacy
as “affect[ing] the very essence of constitutional liberty and security”).
27 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986).
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both in the Court’s own cases30 and in the voluminous scholarship critiquing
them.31 Yet that debate has not, by most accounts, touched on the zone of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary: the Fourth
Amendment’s moral neutrality is seen as a core difference between its
procedural protections and the more substantive privacy rights that have
arisen under the Constitution.
This Part maps out this conventional reading of the Fourth Amendment.
It begins by surveying the broader struggle over moral judgment in the Court’s
privacy cases outside the Fourth Amendment, most notably the privacy rights
recognized under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. It
subsequently contrasts this struggle against the ostensible neutrality of an
individual’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,” a standard considered blind
to the legality—much less the morality—of a defendant’s actions.
A. Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment
It should not be surprising that the Court’s substantive privacy jurisprudence
since the 1960s has raised extensive debates over the moral content of
constitutional rights. Since such substantive rights necessarily attach to specific
activities—the right to marry,32 or to have consensual sex33—recognizing any
new right among the many claims brought before the bench inevitably requires
the Court to consider the nature, and relative worth, of the conduct at issue.34
In assessing such conduct, the Court has generally taken one of two
approaches. In the first mode, the Court envisions the right of privacy as a
shield against the operation of moral judgment, inviting individuals to engage
in certain behaviors—watching obscenity, to take one example—regardless of
their ostensible social value. In the second, by contrast, it envisions privacy
as a reward for morally valued conduct, bestowed precisely in recognition of
the fact that an individual’s activities—marital intercourse, say, but not gay
sodomy—is an established social good.
30 See id. at 195; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (distinguishing due
process privacy, reserved for “fundamental” rights, from First Amendment privacy, which
encompasses lowly matters like obscenity).
31 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 159-60 (2006)
(tracing strains of liberalism and republicanism in due process privacy); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories
of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 66-68 (2006) (arguing that due process features both a
“historical” strand based on tradition and a “reasoned judgment” strand based on independent moral
reasoning); Sandel, supra note 22, at 528 (noting the switch from moralism in Griswold to autonomy in
Roe); Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN.
L. REV. 861, 861-66 (1991) (describing two alternate approaches to privacy since Griswold).
32 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978).
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
34 See also Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 749 (“The court has no choice but to look the conduct in
its face . . . and take its measure.”).
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The morally neutral vision is exemplified most obviously in the Supreme
Court’s 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia.35 The Court in that case held that
the First Amendment bars the government from criminalizing the possession
of obscenity “in the privacy of a person’s own home”36 despite its unquestioned
ability to regulate obscenity in other contexts.37 The Court made no attempts
to defend the social value of such materials,38 nor did it disturb the states’
broad discretion to regulate obscenity in public.39 Rather, it identified the
privacy of the home as a narrow zone of immunity from otherwise operable
morals regulations: a space where even quintessentially antisocial materials
legitimately banned in public are protected by the Constitution.
The Court’s due process privacy cases have sometimes taken this same liberal
approach—not in terms of Stanley’s literal exemption of a particular space from
regulation, but in terms of its indifference to moral value. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
for example, the Court expanded the right of privacy from an entitlement
grounded in the “sacred” intimacies of the marital relationship to one based on the
general principle of reproductive autonomy, shielding even single individuals from
government intrusion “into matters so fundamental[] . . . as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”40 Beginning in Roe v. Wade, the Court echoed that same
individualistic view in upholding the right to obtain an abortion.41 While
consistently stressing the controversial nature of abortion—a practice that, per the
Court, contravenes “the moral standards” of many communities,42 and may even

35
36
37

394 U.S. 557.
Id. at 564.
Obscenity has long stood outside the First Amendment as “utterly without redeeming social
importance.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics
of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1570-76 (1988)
(discussing the Warren Court’s unique tolerance for speech regulations targeting obscenity because
of the justices’ estimation of obscenity’s uniquely low moral value).
38 See Sandel, supra note 22, at 536 (noting Stanley defended obscenity “wholly independent of
[its] value or importance”).
39 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 (“[T]he states retain broad power to regulate obscenity . . . .”).
Subsequent bans have been upheld by the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973)
(transporting obscene material by common carrier); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm.
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (importing obscene material for private use); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (exhibiting obscene material in places of public accommodation); United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (mailing of obscene material).
40 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). The Court technically invalidated the law on equal protection
grounds, id. at 454-55, but its holding relied on an explicit expansion of the right of privacy.
41 See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
42 Id. at 116; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (noting
moral “disagree[ment]”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
771 (1986) (recognizing that abortion raises “moral and spiritual questions over which honorable
persons can disagree sincerely and profoundly”); id. at 797-98 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that Roe did not assume that “abortion is a good in itself ”).
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erode the ideal of the robust nuclear family43—these decisions nevertheless defend
a woman’s right to make significant life choices against society’s moral censure.44
The right of privacy, in the often-quoted words of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, entitles a person to “define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”45 Carving out a space
where individuals can make momentous decisions free from the pressures of public
judgment, this right stands opposed to the project of morals regulation by the state,
providing a type of sanctuary from the operation of collective morality.46
Concurrently with this neutral model, however, the Supreme Court has also
protected a radically different vision of privacy. Far from shielding an individual’s
decisions against moral scrutiny, this second model confers privacy upon those
precise activities that have been scrutinized and found to have moral value.
This moralistic vision undergirds many of the Court’s due process privacy
decisions, prominent cases like Roe notwithstanding. That approach appeared
first in Justice Harlan’s influential dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which challenged
the constitutionality of marital contraceptive bans largely by emphasizing the
respectability of the conduct in question.47 The state’s unquestionable right to
43 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1976); see also Casey, 505
U.S. at 975 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (defending an invalidated abortion restriction as furthering
an established interest in the “integrity of marital relationship”).
44 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-51 (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
45 505 U.S. at 851. As noted, the Court’s exaltation of autonomy might itself be seen as grounded in
moral reasoning, but this is a moral defense of individual choice over lifestyle, not of a particular lifestyle itself.
The difference between the Court’s moralistic and its more autonomy-based cases might also be
understood as a difference in levels of generality, shifting from a privacy right to reproduce into a
privacy-based right to make reproductive choices, but nevertheless entailing a moral judgment about
the human significance of reproductive choices as opposed to, say, the right to commit suicide. Yet while
it is certainly possible to conceptualize such rights on a spectrum, I am more interested in how the
Court itself conceptualizes and articulates them. There is an identifiable difference between privacy
cases that expressly define certain activities as valuable and embraced by society, and those that position
themselves as defending individual choice against social opprobrium. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at
797-98 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Roe did not assume that “abortion is a good in itself”).
46 This strain has led some scholars to describe substantive due process as fundamentally
nonmoralistic. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-12 (2d ed.
1988) (providing a personhood-based theory of privacy); Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins
of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. L. REV. 275, 339 (2014) (arguing that substantive due
process facilitates “authentic self-development”); John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Licensing
Liberty: The Self-Contradictions of Substantive Due Process, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 250-52 (1998)
(emphasizing “moral neutrality”); Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court,
45 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 75 (2000) (arguing that due process privacy limits morals legislation); cf. David
A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 838 (1986)
(arguing that contraceptives and abortion moved due process in an autonomy-based direction).
47 See 367 U.S. 497, 548-55 (1961); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John
Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 5, 22 (1991) (noting that Harlan’s dissent was not “neutral,”
but depended on value of marriage); Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?,
70 IND. L.J. 331, 337 (1995) (arguing that Harlan protected only behaviors that “appeal to a
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patrol “moral soundness” by banning adultery, fornication, and homosexuality,
Justice Harlan insisted, could not extend to sexual intimacy pursued within the
sacred “institution of marriage.”48 The majority’s opinion in Griswold replicated
that same moral tenor, concluding that the uniquely “noble” character of
marriage entitled the intimacies of husband and wife to heightened protection
from the state.49 Several justices wrote separately to emphasize the “particularly
important” nature of the domestic hearth,50 whose privileged constitutional
character “in no way interfere[d] with a State’s proper regulation of sexual
promiscuity or misconduct” in other contexts.51 The right to privacy, so
understood, did not protect an individual’s sexual autonomy. It protected sexual
activities pursued within the traditional confines of domestic respectability.52
In the coming decades, the Court stretched the right of privacy toward a
broader array of “fundamental” liberties, including a panoply of domestic
privileges like marriage, reproduction, and childrearing.53 The Court had long
recognized those rights precisely due to their social value,54 and it
reemphasized that basis now. Marriage fell within the right of privacy as “the
most important relation in life,” without which “there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”55 Childrearing and the nucleus of “family
relations,” including a grandmother’s right to reside with her grandchildren,
qualified due to the “moral and cultural” significance of biological households
in passing down “our most cherished values”56—and could easily be separated
from less conventional domestic arrangements, such as cohabitation among

longstanding moral tradition”). In parts, Harlan’s Poe dissent also recalled the space-driven rationale
of Stanley, decrying any laws that pushed the police into the sacred space of the marital bedroom. 367
U.S. at 548-50 (“I think the sweep of the Court’s decisions . . . amply shows that the Constitution
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character.”).
48 Id. at 546, 553.
49 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 482 (1965).
50 Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 498-99; see also id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting the viability of “ban[s]
on illicit sexual relationships”).
52 See also Sandel, supra note 22, at 527 (characterizing Griswold as “unabashedly teleological[,]
. . . affirming and protecting the social institution of marriage”); Schnably, supra note 31, at 865
(arguing that Griswold protects only “conventional[]” sexual relations).
53 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (characterizing the “right of personal
privacy” as extending to “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education” (citations omitted)).
54 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing marriage
and procreation as “civil rights . . . fundamental to the very existence . . . of the race”); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right of “parents to control the education of
their [children]” as “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as a “fundamental freedom”).
55 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)).
56 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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unrelated persons.57 In some cases, indeed, this moralistic view doubled back
to restrict what the Court had initially recognized as autonomy-based rights:
because abortion undermined a society’s “valid and important interest in
encouraging childbirth,” for example, the right of privacy did not prevent the
state from discriminating against the procedure in its funding programs.58
Nowhere has the Court’s moralistic approach shone more clearly than in
its cases addressing gay rights. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court declined to
extend the right of privacy to homosexual sodomy, deriding the suggestion
that such a long-stigmatized practice might be “rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition” and defending the states’ right to pass “laws representing
essentially moral choices” regarding sexual conduct.59 The dissenters
questioned the Court’s reliance on traditional morality: the right of privacy,
they insisted, protected certain activities not because “they contribute . . . to
the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an
individual’s life.”60 Yet when the Court finally overruled Bowers in Lawrence
v. Texas, it took a different tack.61 Although Justice Kennedy certainly
emphasized the Constitution’s abiding respect “for the autonomy of the
person,”62 he stressed that homosexual conduct deserved protection not only
as a central part of individual identity, but also as a valuable form of human
intimacy: “one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”63 Lawrence
constitutionalized a right to homosexual sodomy by recharacterizing that
conduct as a social good on par with the marital hearth—a meaningful
relationship entitled to “respect,”64 for which additional legal privileges like

57 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) (declining to recognize a right of privacy in
a case upholding a zoning ordinance that limited the number of unrelated persons sharing a residence).
58 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1977); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
(noting that Roe does not bar states from “mak[ing] a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 797-98 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Roe did not assume that “abortion is a good in itself ”).
59 478 U.S. 186, 193-96 (1986).
60 Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the right to privacy as an “individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that will
affect his own, or his family’s destiny” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fitzgerald v.
Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.))).
61 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). Culminating a gradual shift in the Court’s rhetoric, Lawrence
technically protected that right less in the language of privacy than “liberty.” See Jamal Greene, The
So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 717-18 (2010).
62 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
63 Id. at 567; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 142 (2005) (noting that
Lawrence combined the rhetoric of autonomy with a “substantive” claim that the law “wrongfully
demeaned a morally legitimate mode of life”); Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Respecting
Freedom and Cultivating Virtues in Justifying Constitutional Rights, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (2011)
(describing Lawrence as reflecting both individualistic and “moral” claims).
64 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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marriage simply offered “further protection and dignity.”65 Unsurprisingly,
despite Justice Scalia’s warnings that Lawrence would open the floodgates to
any number of “immoral” sexual practices,66 lower courts have declined to
read the case as creating a broad right of sexual autonomy, upholding laws
criminalizing prostitution67 and the sale of sexual devices.68
Lawrence’s redemption of homosexual intimacy, like Bowers’s earlier rejection of
that practice as alien to family life, exemplifies the Court’s moralistic approach to
privacy since the 1960s. If Stanley and Eisenstadt had envisioned privacy as a shield
against normative social constraints, Griswold and most of the cases that followed
reserved that privilege for activities that fit within those constraints, defining
privacy, in essence, as a reward for participating in established moral goods.69
B. The Myth of Fourth Amendment Neutrality
This struggle over the role of moral judgment in the Court’s privacy
jurisprudence is not generally seen to make room for the Fourth
Amendment.70 And understandably so. Unlike the Court’s more substantive
privacy doctrines, which limit the activities the state may lawfully prohibit,
the Fourth Amendment offers a purely procedural safeguard, curbing the
means through which the state may investigate even legitimately criminalized
conduct.71 The Fourth Amendment’s protections, as the Supreme Court has

65 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013); accord Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence protects “geographized and
domesticated” sexual freedom); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 820 (2010) (arguing that Lawrence protects only sex associated with
“emotional intimacy”); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What is Left of Sodomy After
Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOC. TEXT 235, 239 (2005) (arguing that Lawrence provides “no justification
for protecting less-than-transcendental sex [outside] an ongoing relationship”).
66 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67 E.g., United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2007).
68 E.g., Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2007).
69 This moralistic strain has led some to define substantive due process as intrinsically communitarian.
See Gey, supra note 47, at 336 (noting that the right of privacy “bolster[s] society’s dominant mores and
lifestyle”); Adam Hickey, Between Two Spheres: Comparing State and Federal Approaches to the Right to Privacy
and Prohibitions Against Sodomy, 111 YALE L.J. 993, 996 (2002) (arguing that due process privacy protects
“valued” activities); Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 747 (concluding that due process cases impose
“quintessentially normative judgment[s]” about private lives); Schnably, supra note 31, at 867 (reading due
process privacy as protecting sexual freedom “within the confines conventionally recognized by society”).
70 See Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 749 (defining the Fourth Amendment’s conduct-neutral
application as the “critical” difference between it and due process privacy).
71 Id. at 740; see also Colb, supra note 7, at 1666 (characterizing Fourth Amendment protections as
barring “direct perception of individuals’ [activities]”); Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1021-25 (characterizing
Fourth Amendment “privacy” as the right to keep information secret from government).
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frequently remarked, apply equally to “the innocent and guilty alike,”72 to
proven “offenders as well as the law abiding.”73
The conventional wisdom, in context, is that the Fourth Amendment is simply
blind to a defendant’s actual conduct. As Jed Rubenfeld observes, judges assessing
a defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy “must resist the temptation to
steal a glance at the claimant’s substantive conduct” in any case.74 It is “well
established,” echoes Jeffrey Skopek, that “the type of information at issue in a
search is irrelevant to the Katz test.”75 Even scholars who argue as a matter of
policy that the Fourth Amendment should privilege innocent over criminal
conduct, providing lesser protections to defendants actually engaged in crime,
agree that in practice the Court’s jurisprudence brooks no such distinction.76
To be sure, the social value of a defendant’s conduct may factor into the
Fourth Amendment in other ways. Beyond the initial definition of a search,
courts assessing the “reasonableness” of a given tactic have long balanced the
relative value of an individual’s privacy interests against the public utility of the
search.77 The types of activities pursued in one’s home versus one’s automobile
might call for different levels of suspicion to justify similar police tactics. And
even the definition of a search, beginning with Katz’s defense of the “vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication,”78 has
sometimes considered the importance of activities typically conducted in a given
place. It is this reliance on behavioral norms that has sometimes distributed
Fourth Amendment protections, as critics have objected, along cultural and
72
73

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); accord, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217, 229 (1969); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
74 Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 749.
75 Skopek, supra note 9, at 704 n.52; see also Colb, supra note 9, at 1510 (observing that privacy
interests “must be described without reference to the criminal activity” disclosed); Aziz Z. Huq, How
the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139,
147 (2016) (insisting that the “reasonableness of a search does not depend on its object or what it
happens to discover but rather on the manner in which the government behaves”).
76 See Colb, supra note 9, at 1461-64, 1510 (arguing that only the innocent are harmed by
warrantless searches but noting that Court generally does not consider defendant’s actions); Arnold
H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229,
1229-30 (1983) (proposing a shift from the Court’s criminality-blind jurisprudence).
77 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). Scholars have commonly urged attention to the
value of the inhibited conduct at this stage. E.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK (2007)
(suggesting a sliding scale of suspicion for digital surveillance based in part on the nature of activities
implicated); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 670-71, 675 (2013)
(suggesting that courts assess “reasonableness” by weighing the social value of inhibited activities against the
value of the search); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO
THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-4.2(b) (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_access.authchec
kdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/X55S-QTJR] (calibrating the level of suspicion needed to justify a
police search in part based on the social value of intercepted communications).
78 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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class lines—distinguishing private residences from shared residential spaces,
for example, based on the typical domestic arrangements of the middle class.
Yet other scholars have embraced such norms as helpful limits on the Fourth
Amendment, proposing to limit constitutional protections to spheres that
predictably house intimate or domestic activities.79
This Article will revisit both the provenance and merits of that activities-based
inquiry, as well as the difference between tying it to the “reasonableness” of a search
or the definition of a “search” itself. For present purposes, it suffices to observe two
things. First, this inquiry draws broad lines around the categories of activities
typically associated with certain spaces, protecting homes or garages or telephone
booths, for example, as areas commonly used for intimate or personal ends. It does
not tie Fourth Amendment protections to a particular defendant’s actual conduct,
so long as it takes place within that protected space.80 Second, commentators who
urge greater protections for “intimate association” or domestic activities often see
that distinction as embedded within the history of the Fourth Amendment, which
has long identified the home at the center of its protections.81 They do not defend
a fresh, case-by-case inquiry into the value of a defendant’s activities.
More controversially, a number of scholars have suggested that the Court
in fact allots Fourth Amendment protections based on the nature of the actual
information discovered. As early as 1987, Richard Wilkins proposed that the
Court’s analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy takes into account “the
object or goal of the surveillance,” defined retrospectively in light of “the
information obtained as a result of the surveillance.”82 More recently, Orin
Kerr has argued that the Supreme Court’s analysis of privacy expectations
under Katz sometimes follows a “private facts” approach that assesses whether
the “information the government collects . . . is private and worthy of
79 See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311, 313 (2013) (arguing
for a transconstitutional vision of privacy privileging domestic spaces, intimacy, and sexual activities); see
also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1283, 1336 (2014) (tracing an emphasis on intimacy to early Fourth Amendment roots and urging
protections for “personal curtilage” in “personal or intimate” contexts, including “religious worship,
health, family, or romantic activities,” but not “professional, political, or overtly public activities”);
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 905, 940 (2010) (suggesting limiting privacy expectations in the home to spaces likely to
implicate “domestic life” and “intimate association,” but not less domestic spaces); cf. Ric Simmons, From
Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1306 (2002) (arguing the Katz test should consider the “type of information”
acquired, but defining “result” in terms of spaces intruded rather than actual activities revealed).
80 Selbst, supra note 77, at 670-71; Simmons, supra note 79, at 1306; Stern, supra note 79, at 940.
In Katz itself, the telephone’s significance in interpersonal communications insulated it from the
police, regardless of the defendant’s use of that space not for intimate banter but for illegal wagering.
389 U.S. at 352; accord id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81 See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 79, at 1292.
82 Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1080, 1105.
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constitutional protection,” effectively defining a search based on “what
information the government collected rather than how it was obtained.”83
Such scholars have, I believe, undertheorized how precisely the “worth” of
such information is assessed. Although initially suggesting that the Court
privileges “interpersonal” or “intimate” data, Wilkins ultimately concludes that
courts discount information that is “inherently ‘public’” or commonly used by
public entities, such as car registration data84—metrics that come down to an
individual’s risk of exposure more than the nature of the information revealed.
Meanwhile, Kerr identifies a series of principles behind the Court’s retrospective
analysis, including that it protects “particularly private” or “particularly
personal” information, and that it protects disclosures that individuals experience
as most intrusive—a severe medical condition, for example, but not “a bad hair
day.”85 Yet these principles are, if faithful to the Court’s own justifications,
somewhat tautological, according greater privacy protections to more “private”
facts without clarifying which facts raise greater privacy concerns.86
Unsurprisingly, such scholars have generally embraced the Court’s retrospective
inquiry as essentially coextensive with the very idea of protecting “privacy”
under the Constitution—an intuitive proxy for the Katz standard.87
In short, while commentators have sometimes noted both the role of social
value in Fourth Amendment doctrine and the Court’s intermittent attention
to the results of a search, they have rarely put those concepts in dialogue. By
the conventional view, the reasonable expectation of privacy test either
remains blind to a defendant’s conduct or, at most, discriminates in favor of
uniquely personal data. The concept of a Fourth Amendment privacy right
based on the social value of an individual’s activities, similar to that in
Griswold or Bowers, has yet to be seriously entertained.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S MORALISTIC TURN
The Court’s assessment of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment has
more in common with its due process homonym than is typically recognized. Like
the Court’s analysis of due process privacy rights, the Court’s evaluations of an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy have frequently depended on its
moral appraisals of the activities at issue in a given case. More than reflecting
normative ideals of the criminal justice system—the proper relationship between
the individual and the state—Fourth Amendment privacy rights commonly trade
83
84
85
86

Kerr, supra note 15, at 512-13.
Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1106, 1122-23.
Kerr, supra note 15, at 514, 534.
Kerr’s suggestion that the Court privileges data that individuals least want revealed also fails to fit
the Court’s cases, which frequently deny protections for stigmatic facts. See discussion infra subsection V.A.1.
87 See Kerr, supra note 15, at 540-43; Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1104-05.
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in normative judgments about the value of private behaviors. And, like the Due
Process Clause once more, those judgments tend to privilege conventionally prized
relationships: domestic life, “intimate” conduct, and other meaningful social bonds.
This Part traces how the social value of an individual’s private conduct became
a core consideration in the Court’s definition of a search under Katz. It first traces
the rise of the reasonable expectation of privacy test as a standard focused on not
simply the external characteristics of a given space, but also the social value of an
individual’s activities there. It then examines how those activities came to be
measured on a particular metric: domestic or interpersonal intimacy. The first
part of this story will likely be familiar, though I hope to illuminate it as part of
a broader doctrinal shift. The second might be more surprising. Hardly a legacy
of the Fourth Amendment’s traditional preoccupation with the home, the Court’s
emphasis on intimacy as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment safeguards is a
novel inquiry emerging largely from the Katz privacy test.
A. The Moralism of “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy”
The history of the Fourth Amendment protections in the twentieth century
is commonly characterized as a shift from “property” to “privacy,” culminating
in the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States.88 To be sure, privacy first
appeared as an animating principle of the Fourth Amendment long before Katz;
beginning with Boyd v. United States in 1886,89 the Court has often characterized
unreasonable searches as offenses against the fundamental “privacy of
persons.”90 Yet in Katz, that principle emerged as the undisputed linchpin of
search and seizure doctrine, in an opinion that the staunchly textualist Justice
Black decried as a willful “rewriting” of the Fourth Amendment.91
The defendant in Katz was convicted of bookmaking based on a wiretap in a
public telephone booth.92 Katz challenged the recording as an unlawful “search”
of his private conversations, and the Court agreed. Disavowing its earlier
suggestions that a search required some physical trespass on a defendant’s
property, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
88
89

389 U.S. 347; see, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 15, at 1085-86.
116 U.S. 616, 630 (condemning government intrusions into “the sanctity of a man’s home
and the privacies of life”).
90 E.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 174 (1911); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(extending “the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy” against the states); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 709 (1948) (characterizing the Fourth Amendment as protecting a “right of privacy”); Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment concern with “personal
privacy”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment to
protect “the right of privacy”); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (characterizing the Fourth
Amendment as protecting the “privacy of the home or office and of the papers of the owner”).
91 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
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places,” and thus may extend to information that a person “seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public.”93 In Katz itself, the defendant
“justifiably” relied on the privacy of the telephone booth due to the social
significance of that space—“the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication.”94 Concurring, Justice Harlan characterized that
right more systematically: the Fourth Amendment protects an individual from
state intrusions whenever he or she “exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”95
In subsequent years, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation
of privacy” rule as its own.96 Fleshing out Justice Harlan’s test with the language of
the Katz majority, the Court clarified that this inquiry involved two discrete
questions: first, whether an individual “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy” by “seek[ing] to preserve [something] as private,” and second, whether
that expectation was “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”
because, “viewed objectively, [it] is ‘justifiable’ under the circumstances.”97
The “subjective” prong seemed straightforward enough.98 But how were
judges to evaluate whether an individual’s expectation of privacy was
“objectively” reasonable? The Court has provided no coherent test of
reasonableness,99 and a common criticism of the Katz test denigrates it as too
open-ended, unpredictable and easily manipulated.100
One interpretation is that the second prong simply tests the objective realism
of the individual’s perceptions: whether, measured from the perspective of a
reasonable person, the individual fairly formed her subjective expectation of
privacy.101 That interpretation echoes Justice Harlan’s own analysis in Katz, which
93
94
95
96

Id. at 351-53.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 361.
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“Since Katz v. United States, the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
97 E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (second alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353, 361).
98 But see Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 127-33 (2015) (questioning the conventional assumption that Katz’s first step
authorizes inquiry into subjective beliefs).
99 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“We have no talisman
that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”).
100 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 349 (“[T]he law of the fourth amendment is not the
Supreme Court’s most successful product.”); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth
Amendment: Confessions of A Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2557-58 (1996) (surveying
criticisms of declining Fourth Amendment protections under the Katz doctrine); Wasserstrom &
Seidman, supra note 10, at 69 (describing the Katz test as “notorious[ly] circular[]”).
101 See, e.g., Colb, supra note 9, at 1513 (describing the Court’s “empirical formulation” of
reasonableness); Stephen P. Jones, Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing Room,
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noted, by example, that “conversations in the open would not be protected against
being overheard.”102 Over the next decades, the Court appeared to apply such an
analysis in numerous cases, holding that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in her financial records because she “voluntarily . . .
exposed” them to her bank103; or in the records of dialed phone numbers, because
a caller “assume[s] the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed”104; or in the movements of a car under beeper surveillance,
as drivers “voluntarily convey[] to anyone who want[s] to look the fact that [they
are] travelling over particular roads.”105 By this reading, Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test passes no judgments about the type of information it
protects, but simply examines the individual’s objective risks of public exposure.
Yet in no ambiguous terms, the Court soon clarified that Katz’s second
prong also involves a more normative inquiry. Far from reflecting “the mere
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the
attention of the authorities,”106 the legitimacy of an individual’s expectation
of privacy depends on “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”107 Under
the Katz test, it thus turned out, the Fourth Amendment protects neither
places nor even persons, precisely, but values.
Divorcing the “reasonableness” of an individual’s privacy expectations from
probability levels an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections both down
and up. It levels down such rights where an individual has a mathematically
justifiable expectation of secrecy in circumstances that clearly deserve no
constitutional sanction: a burglar breaking into an isolated cabin,108 or an abuser
taking over his victim’s home.109 Yet it also prevents the government from
shrinking the public’s privacy expectations simply by advertising its intrusive
tactics, such as announcing “on nationwide television” a plan to conduct
warrantless searches.110 By this approach, the inquiry into reasonableness seeks
27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 923-24 (1997) (discussing the Court’s assumption of risk analysis); Kerr, supra
note 15, at 508-12 (identifying “probabilistic” analysis as one of the Court’s approaches to Katz).
102 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
104 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
105 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983); cf., e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213-14 (1986) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on land theoretically
exposed to public air traffic).
106 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
107 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Cloud, supra
note 25, at 250 (noting that Katz’s second prong asks courts “to define fundamental constitutional
values by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes”).
108 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
109 See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 762 S.E.2d 584, 592 (W. Va. 2014); State v. Stephenson, 760
N.W.2d 22, 26-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
110 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
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to reflect not only the type of society we have, but also the type we want to live
in—the degree of state power we wish to accept in a “free and open society.”111
In the years since Katz, the Court has looked to numerous sources in evaluating
that policy question. It has, as discussed, examined whether the information in
question was effectively shielded from public scrutiny.112 It has relied on the text of
the Fourth Amendment, both as a constitutional baseline for certain enumerated
objects and to illuminate the relative value of others.113 It has looked to “the
intention of the Framers” and to historical understandings of which intrusions were
“perceived to be objectionable” at the Amendment’s drafting.114 And it has relied
on positive law, from property rights115 to administrative regulatory regimes,116 to
determine which privacy expectations or which government tactics have received
the sanction of local communities.117 All of these inquiries are essentially objective:
they require no fresh value judgments about a given space, but simply assess the
prevailing legal and physical expectations that accompany it.
Yet another major component of the Court’s approach to “reasonableness”
has come to focus precisely on how a given space is typically used—an inquiry
that tracks what the Court has sometimes termed “our societal understanding
that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection.”118 Setting aside the
physical parameters of the setting, or the positive laws and entitlements that
attach to it, this inquiry assumes that some categories of private conduct simply
deserve more constitutional protections than other (entirely legal) activities.
In some cases, an area may deserve especially rigorous protections due to the
embarrassing nature of the acts it conceals. Lower courts, for example, frequently
111 Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reasonableness inquiry must not “merely recite the
[individual’s] expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon
society”); Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 403 (characterizing the “ultimate question” of the Katz test
as whether surveillance techniques are consistent with the “aims of a free and open society”).
112 See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text.
113 E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (insisting on strong protections for “effects”
transported in the mail); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (concluding based on its text that
the Fourth Amendment protects all “effects,” whether they are “personal” or “impersonal”).
114 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977)).
115 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) (identifying the “existence of a
property right” as “one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate”);
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (identifying “reference to concepts of real or personal property law” as a
potential basis to identify a legitimate privacy expectation).
116 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (finding a diminished expectation of
privacy in an automobile given state and local motor regulations).
117 See generally William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2016) (arguing that Fourth Amendment protections should
depend on provisions of law generally applicable to private actors).
118 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178; see also Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1055 (noting the reasonable
expectation of privacy test protects only those spaces “likely to contain the sorts of things that many
people would prefer be kept private”).
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extend generous Fourth Amendment rights in public bathrooms, even where those
spaces carry significant risk of exposure.119 Among those cases that have reached
the Supreme Court, however, privileged spaces tend to implicate loftier concerns:
activities that bear some unique social or emotional significance. Thus, the Court
bestows particularly strict protections on the home, the “sacred” sanctum of family
life.120 And it typically protects spaces surrounding the home, such as patios and
backyards, as zones harboring “the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of
a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”121 But it does not protect open fields, which
are commonly employed for agricultural pursuits lacking such domestic
significance.122 Similarly, the Court protects public phonebooths due to the social
value of telephone conversations, which play a “vital role . . . in private
communication.”123 But it does not protect records of telephone numbers, which
“do not acquire the contents of communications” and thus cannot, per the Court,
reveal intimate details about the speakers.124 And it sometimes does not protect the
insides of cars, which “seldom serve[] . . . as the repository of personal effects.”125
By this logic, certain activities and the sites that house them are simply
more important as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned. The value
judgments involved in this inquiry do not address the types of police tactics
we want to authorize in our democratic society. They address the types of
private activities we want to encourage and protect. The normativity of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, in short, does not just demarcate the
ideal scope and nature of the criminal justice system—the risks of overreach
we want to accept vis-à-vis the state. It also imposes a hierarchy of
communitarian judgments on the value of citizens’ private acts.
The sites that the Court deems especially valuable should sound familiar.
They are typically sites that touch on conventional forms of interpersonal
intimacy: social or domestic spaces that abut, in the Court’s own words, on
“those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter.”126

119 E.g., State v. Smith, 97 P.3d 567, 570-71 (Mont. 2004) (explaining that occupants of both
public and private restrooms have a reasonable expectation of privacy “given the personal and private
nature of one’s usual activities within a bathroom”); accord Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 111718 (E.D. Pa. 1975); State v. Holt, 630 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1981); cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (noting the unique personal invasiveness of urine test).
120 E.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984).
121 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180).
122 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179-81.
123 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
124 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
125 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
126 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
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B. A History of Fourth Amendment Intimacy
The Court’s emphasis on intimacy in allotting Fourth Amendment
protections may seem intuitive. Yet it is in fact a relatively recent
phenomenon, dating back largely to Katz’s recentering of Fourth Amendment
rights around privacy rather than property. Katz’s inquiry into an individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy—defined not as a probabilistic analysis but
a deeply normative one, concerned in key part with the activities pursued in
a given space—recalibrated the constitutional status of even established
Fourth Amendment zones around the intimate nature of the acts conducted
there. That transformation may be illuminated by a very brief history of
Fourth Amendment protections, focusing on the example of the home.
1. Origins and Early Republic
An individual’s home stands at the center of the Fourth Amendment,
among the privileged items enumerated in the text and a “first among equals”
there.127 The unpermitted entry into the household, the Court has declared,
“is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.”128 Yet the rationale underlying the home’s rarefied status has been
neither constant nor self-evident.129
As a general matter, the eighteenth-century sentiments against general
warrants and writs of assistance that coalesced into the Fourth Amendment
defended neither intimacy nor domesticity, but a broader sphere of private life,
including expressive, political, and commercial conduct.130 The highest-profile
controversies surrounding general warrants, the cases against John Entick and
John Wilkes in England, involved searches of publishers accused of seditious
libel131—the type of government conduct we currently rein in not through the
Fourth Amendment, but through the First.132 Responding to these altercations,
127 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
128 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
129 See also Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 659 (2011) (declaring Fourth Amendment
solicitude for the home “undertheorized”).
130 See Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property
Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 994 (2016); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1315-16 (2016).
131 See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 2 Wils. K. B. 274; Wilkes v. Wood (1763)
98 Eng. Rep. 489; Lofft 1.
132 See Donohue, supra note 130, at 1259; Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Private “Papers”
As Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 61-66 (2013); William
J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-404 (1995). The outcry
over these cases partly reflected a concern with the substantive crimes targeted, judging the state’s
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early debates about the proper limits of state searches focused especially on papers,
including business letters, as man’s “dearest property”133: windows into an
individual’s “secret thoughts,”134 the seizure of which was “least capable of
reparation.”135 What could be “more excruciating torture,” demanded one widely
read pamphleteer, than to have the government intrude upon one’s “secret
correspondences,” whether between a husband and his wife, a “lawyer [and] his
clients,” or a “merchant . . . and his correspondents”?136 Beyond the libel cases,
the core instances of government intrusion that perturbed the Framers involved
intrusions on commercial conduct: searches aimed at uncovering goods smuggled
into the colonies without paying appropriate excise taxes.137 Unsurprising, in
context, that the Fourth Amendment’s core protections extended not only to
homes but also warehouses and businesses, preserving the individual’s property,
including commercial and other nondomestic goods, beyond the state’s reach.138
The privileged status of the home itself reflected these broader concerns.
From British common law to the taxation debates in the colonies, speakers
defined the sanctity of the home not through its domestic nature, but
primarily through a man’s unique property and sovereignty interests in his
own land. Early complaints about writs of assistance, for example, commonly
focused on searches of desks, those repositories of personal and commercial
correspondence.139 And the popular aphorism that a “man’s home is his
castle”140 signaled one of two things. First, it meant that a man could exercise
monopoly over the use of force on his property, entitled to kill or assemble
violent crowds in self-defense,141 and immune from most forms of arrest or
procedures, in essence, based on sympathy for the private behaviors targeted. Donohue, supra note
130, at 1208-09; Stuntz, supra, at 394. Yet those privileged behaviors were not domestic life, but
speech and dissent.
133 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; 2 Wils. K. B. at 291.
134 Id. at 812, 2 Wils. K. B. at 283.
135 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490, Lofft at 2; see also 16 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 10 (1813) (quoting an argument characterizing “papers” as “dearer to a man than his
heart’s blood”); Donohue, supra note 130, at 1316-17; Dripps, supra note 132, at 52.
136 JOHN ALMON, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, AND THE SEIZURE OF
PAPERS 43-44 (2d ed. 1764); see also Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807; 2 Wils. K. B. at 283 (decrying
intrusions into “a man’s private letters of correspondence, family concerns, trade and business”).
137 See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 380-84 (1980); Thomas
Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 566-67 (1999).
138 E.g., M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978) (decrying the state’s
entrance into “houses, shops, etc., at will”); see also Brady, supra note 130, at 989-90 (discussing the
Fourth Amendment’s concern with non-domestic property); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment
During the Lochner Era, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 575 (1996); Donohue, supra note 130, at 1185.
139 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 548 (2009).
140 This maxim is commonly credited as the root of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 222 (1988).
141 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596 n.44 (1980); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *288.
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compunctions of legal authority.142 Second, it meant that a man’s tangible
“goods” were secure upon it.143 These emphases were consistent with the
social significance of the homestead in colonial times, both as a deeply
hierarchical unit of economic production and as a man’s right of entry into
the political community.144
To be sure, some writers emphasized the home’s unique character as the site of
domestic activities—a haven, in Samuel Adams’s words, of that “domestick security
which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreable.”145 But even
writers who recognized the familial value of the home often characterized the chief
evil of arbitrary intrusions as an offense against property and sovereignty, rather
than intimacy: the affront of “carry[ing] off [a man’s] property” from his
domicile,146 or of undermining the home’s complete “Fortification,” like a castle
“defended with a Garrison and Artillery,” in which a man justly “takes a Pride.”147
To disrespect a man’s authority in his own abode, in the words of John Adams, was
to treat him “not like an Englishman . . . but like a slave.”148 This same principle
emerged, more obliquely, in the early law of curtilage. The concept of curtilage
originated in the British common law in the context of burglary, a traditional
property crime, and was defined by its geographical proximity to the main house:

142 See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 125-26 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965) (“A man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all
his Debts, and civil Processes of any kind.”); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 320 n.2 (2d ed. 1871) (quoting Lord Chatham to illustrate that “[t]he poorest man
may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may
not.”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 141, at *288 (“[F]or the most part not so much as a common citation
or summons, much less an arrest, can be executed upon a man within his own walls.”).
143 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914).
144 See Davies, supra note 137, at 642 n.259 (“[O]wning a house [] was the general standard for
membership in the English political community.”); see also Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family
Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 573-75 (1992). See generally MARY P.
RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (1981).
145 SAMUEL ADAMS, A STATE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (1772), reprinted in TRACTS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 233, 243-44 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967) (historical spellings maintained); see A
LETTER TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 43 (Philadelphia, William Bradford &
Thomas Bradford 1774) (warning against entries into “houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort”); 15
COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1307 (1813) (quoting William Pitt denouncing excise
laws as invading “domestic concerns of every private family”); see also Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 137, at
395 (discussing pamphlets defending the “innocent Secrets” and “private Oeconomy [sic]” of the family).
146 ADAMS, supra note 145, at 243-44.
147 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 142, at 137; see also Cuddihy & Hardy, supra
note 137, at 396 (quoting a pamphlet warning of government “climb[ing] into our Bed Chambers”
as a metaphor for state violence).
148 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 147, at 137; see also 32 LONDON MAG. 254,
256 (1763) (reporting on contemporaneous legal arguments and denouncing home searches for excise
enforcement as “a badge of slavery”).
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by Blackstone’s account, the presence of a common fence or wall.149 Yet while some
early American courts echoed the English definition,150 most found it poorly
suited to the architectural landscape of the United States.151 State courts
adjudicating property disputes soon added a purposivist dimension, defining
curtilage as land both proximate to the home and—in what might initially seem
like a significant change—“used for domestic purposes,”152 as an “adjunct to the
domestic economy of the family.”153 That rhetorical shift partly reflected the
evolving economic organization of the nation, as industrialization and
urbanization rechristened the family as the sanctum of domestic intimacy rather
than a site of production.154 Crucially, however, lower courts’ references to
“domestic” use did not conflate the curtilage with intimate family relations. To the
contrary, zones recognized as serving habitually “domestic purposes” were often
commercial or agricultural, including cowhouses, barns, stables, and fields.155
2. Early Supreme Court Precedent
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s early Fourth Amendment cases
rarely distinguished between personal and impersonal activities. To the contrary,
they privileged the same expressive and proprietary interests emphasized by early
commentators. Thus, the Court’s seminal opinion in Boyd, which so resoundingly
defended “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” involved the
government’s coercion not of domestic artifacts but of a defendant’s business
records.156 And it defined a man’s sacred “privacies,” quite loosely, as his
“indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”157
Similarly, early Supreme Court opinions lauding the home focused on the
security of a man’s papers and effects—including those of a commercial nature.
149 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 141, at *224-25; see also Ferguson, supra note 79, at 1313-14
(discussing the historical development of the concept of curtilage); Brendan Peters, Fourth
Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 952-54 (2004).
150 See, e.g., State v. Bugg, 72 P. 236, 237 (Kan. 1903); State v. Hecox, 83 Mo. 531, 536 (1884);
People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250, 252 (1851).
151 See Ferguson, supra note 79, at 1315-16.
152 Washington v. State, 2 So. 365, 357 (Ala. 1887). For other cases emphasizing domestic use
rather than just proximity, see United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961), United States
v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D. Md. 1967), Littke v. State, 258 P.2d 211, 213-14 (Okla. Crim.
1953), Fugate v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.2d 1020, 1022 (Ky. 1943), Appeal of Damon, 13 A. 217, 21920 (Pa. 1888), and State v. Shaw, 31 Me. 523, 527 (1850).
153 Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956); see also United States v. Wolfe, 375
F. Supp. 949, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
154 See McMullen, supra note 144, at 575-76 (1992); see also NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD 64-74 (1977). See generally RYAN, supra note 144.
155 See Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (garages, barns, smokehouses, and chicken houses); Cook v. State, 3 So. 849,
850 (Ala. 1888) (gardens, fields, barns, stables, cowhouses, and dairy houses).
156 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
157 Id.
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In Weeks v. United States, the Court applied the principle that a “man’s house is
his castle” to defend the privacy of “letters and sealed packages in the mail.”158
The first case to extend Fourth Amendment protections to curtilage, Amos v.
United States, did so based on a warrantless search of a commercial store on the
defendant’s property.159 Subsequent cases simply cited Blackstone’s
Commentaries, with its territorial definition of curtilage as property “within
the same common fence” as the main house.160 Any suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment might privilege domestic “intimacies”—either that precise term
or the broader concept—appeared only in the opinions of dissenting justices,
protesting the majority’s more mechanical property-based approach.161
Consistent with both colonial rhetoric against government searches and with
the early law of curtilage, in short, the Supreme Court’s initial Fourth Amendment
cases emphasized an individual’s interest in his commercial pursuits and personal
papers more than his intimate or familial bonds. Echoing the Court’s broader rights
discourse at the time, these cases reflected an essentially Lochnerian hierarchy of
goods, placing the protection of property at the heart of constitutional liberty.162
3. After Katz
Only after Katz did intimacy enter the Court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis—ironically, in some of the very cases typically seen to exemplify a
purely exposure-based approach to reasonableness.163 Thus, one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in telephone records under Smith v. Maryland
depended, in part, on whether such records revealed only anonymous
metadata or the “intimate details of a person’s life.”164 One’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in banking records under United States v. Miller relied
on whether those records “touch[ed] upon intimate areas of an individual’s
158
159
160

232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914).
255 U.S. 313, 314 (1921).
See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); cf. State v. Foster, 40 S.E. 209, 210
(N.C. 1901) (distinguishing fixtures merely located on “curtilage” and those sufficiently domestic to
trigger burglary statute).
161 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf. Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
162 See Amar, supra note 25, at 788 (noting Boyd’s Lochnerian “spirit”); see also Cloud, supra note
138, at 558-59.
163 See, e.g., Jane Bombauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 212-13 (2015) (discussing
cases like Smith and Miller as turning on defendant’s exposure of private data); David A. Harris, Riley
v. California and the Beginning of the End for the Third-Party Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
895, 904-05 (2016) (describing the third-party doctrine cases as based solely on formalistic exposure).
164 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id. at 741 (majority opinion)
(distinguishing a pen register “from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not
acquire the contents of communications”).
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personal affairs.”165 Often seen as hinging on the defendants’ exposure to
third parties, and thus as paradigmatic of the probabilistic approach to
reasonableness, cases like Smith and Miller in fact rehearsed the Court’s
newfound emphasis on intimacy as a core Fourth Amendment value.
The Court’s newfound rhetoric was primarily a matter of leveling up,
expanding constitutional protections to novel sites of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny not easily resolved by traditional property rules or by the more
probabilistic approach. Where, by contrast, an item or space was clearly within
the text or other established zone of the Fourth Amendment, the distinction
between “personal” and “impersonal” was theoretically less relevant. As the
Court insisted in Robbins v. California, rejecting the suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment encompassed only containers holding “personal effects,” the
language of the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “effects whether they are
‘personal’ or ‘impersonal.’ . . . [A] diary and a dishpan are equally protected.”166
In practice, however, the Court’s valorization of intimacy soon invaded even the
most traditional Fourth Amendment zones, including domestic property. In Oliver
v. United States, for example, the Court revisited its distinction between protected
curtilage and mere “open fields,” hanging its distinction not on Blackstone’s fence
but on the intimacy of the activities pursued on each site.167 Curtilage, the Court
explained, is protected as that “area to which extends the intimate activity associated
with ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”168 By contrast, open
fields used for agricultural activities like the “cultivation of crops” simply “do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to
shelter.”169 Here the doctrinal switch from defining curtilage around its “domestic
purpose” to its “intimate use” came out most clearly: those agricultural activities
that Oliver defined as beyond family affairs would have been at the heart of the
domestic economy of the family in the nineteenth century.170
Following Oliver, “intimacy” entered the center of curtilage analysis, both
among lower courts and at the Supreme Court. In United States v. Dunn in 1987,
the Court articulated a formal four-part test for identifying protected curtilage,
examining not only the area’s proximity to the home and the defendant’s attempts
165 425 U.S. 435, 444 n.6 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that records revealing data about
“a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs” would implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy)).
166 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
167 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
168 Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also Peters, supra note 149,
at 956-57 (arguing that Oliver created “modern curtilage doctrine” by supplementing territorial
definitions with a focus on intimate activities).
169 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
170 Compare id., with, e.g., Cook v. State, 3 So. 849, 850 (Ala. 1888) (cataloging gardens, fields,
barns, stables, cowhouses, and dairy houses as usually part of the curtilage).

1218

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1189

to keep it hidden, but also the “nature of uses to which the area is put.”171 In that
case, the Court concluded, the sound of a running motor and smell of a (legal and
multipurpose) chemical emitting from the defendant’s barn—indicating that he
used the structure not for the “privacies of domestic life” but for more
unorthodox activities—was an “especially significant” indication that no curtilage
was involved.172 Even in a space traditionally within the auspices of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court’s newfound focus on “intimacy” thus limited
constitutional protections to conventional domestic or familial pursuits.
*

*

*

Far from an outgrowth of the Fourth Amendment’s history or its early focus on
the home, in short, the Court’s emphasis on intimacy at the center of Fourth
Amendment protections is a fairly recent constitutional innovation, tracing back to
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test. The Court’s assessment of
“reasonableness” under Katz recalibrated constitutional rights for even traditionally
protected zones around a novel inquiry into the nature of the activities pursued
within them. By this approach, an individual who engages in conventionally
“intimate” acts—typically, those implicating family life or significant interpersonal
communications—simply has a greater claim to constitutional privacy than one
engaged in other perfectly legal activities, such as chemistry experiments or the
cultivation of crops. Echoing the historic trajectory of the Court’s substantive due
process jurisprudence, which shifted over the twentieth century from protecting
economic rights to protecting intimate conduct,173 the Fourth Amendment
recentered its protections from commercial property to interpersonal relations.
The Court’s initial implication that certain areas deserve more
“scrupulous protection”174 based on the activities they house already
introduced a value-based inquiry into the Fourth Amendment. Its clarification
that such areas typically house “intimate” activities moved that inquiry
explicitly into the realm of communitarian judgment, privileging certain types
of private pursuits—specifically, social and domestic relations—over other
perfectly legal conduct. And, in practice, it privileged very particular social
arrangements. In theory, of course, “intimacy” might be seen as a broad category,
giving individuals room to choose their preferred types of significant relationships.
Yet as invoked by the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, “intimacy” suggests a fairly
171 480 U.S. 294, 301.
172 Id. at 302-03.
173 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 483, 502-03 (1997) (discussing the Court’s transition from the economic substantive due process

model of Lochner to the intimacy-based approach of Griswold); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and
the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1341 (2001) (same).
174 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
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narrow and conventional social norm: familial, romantic, or otherwise deep
emotional bonds. It is hard to argue that the same Court that exalted “intimate”
ties like marriage175 and enduring sexual relations176 as constitutionally sacred under
the Due Process Clause does not see intimacy as a freighted term: a proxy for
uniquely valuable social and sexual arrangements. Recalling the reasoning of
moralistic due process cases like Griswold, the Court’s redefinition of Fourth
Amendment protections as “intended to shelter” intimate activities circumscribes
privacy rights around its own view of worthwhile private pursuits.
III. EXAMINING ACTUAL CONDUCT
So far, of course, we have largely been dealing with a prospective inquiry,
defining the constitutional status of certain spaces based on the typical uses
to which they are put. Thus, the home, although perhaps protected due to its
association with intimate family life,177 is shielded from intrusion whether
used to cook dinner or to manufacture drugs.178 And even the Court’s
definition of “curtilage” based on “the uses to which [an] area is put” has been
interpreted to depend on “objective data” obtained prior to a government
intrusion.179 Such rules do not ground individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights
on their actual activities, but rather on broad social norms attaching to the
uses associated with a given space.
With some frequency, however, the Court’s assessments of reasonable
expectations of privacy have also come to depend on the social value of
individual’s actual conduct when discovered by the police. Borrowing a
retrospective lens commonly identified with its due process privacy cases but
generally deemed inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
repeatedly measured an individual’s privacy interests based not on
conventional expectations surrounding a space but on the nature of her

175
176
177

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (“[T]he home is sacred in Fourth
Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants’ possessory interests in the premises, but
because of their privacy interests in the activities that take place within.”); see also New York v. Harris,
495 U.S. 14, 27 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that “[a]n invasion into the home is . . .
the worst kind,” as it intrudes “on the individual’s solitude and on the family’s communal bonds”).
178 E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-18 (1984) (holding that a police beeper hidden
in cocaine-making supplies stored inside a home violated the Fourth Amendment).
179 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1987). Numerous lower courts have explicitly
adopted that requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001)
(requiring some “prior objective knowledge of the use of an outbuilding”); Daughenbaugh v. City
of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming that objective data is required prior to a search);
United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1515 (10th Cir. 1993) (requiring objective data that personal
property is not used for intimate activities prior to invasion).
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specific acts. 180 This Part tracks this development in three areas of the law:
aerial surveillance of curtilage, visitors in the homes, and the detection of drugs.
A. Aerial Surveillance of Curtilage
When the Court defined “curtilage” based on, among other things, the
uses to which the area is put, that test was subject to two caveats. First, the
Court based this inquiry on data obtained prior to a search itself; and second,
that test assessed whether a particular area was in fact “curtilage,” and thereby
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections.181
Since then, the Court’s curtilage cases have primarily centered on the
validity of aerial surveillance and other novel technologies for inspecting
domestic land. And that caselaw has deviated in two ways. First, the Court
has held that an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights depend on the nature
of her activities even on land that indisputably qualifies as curtilage. And
second, it has tied an individual’s privacy expectations to the intimate nature
of the actual activities disclosed.
This shift began in California v. Ciraolo, in which police officers flying a
helicopter over the defendant’s home observed marijuana growing in his
enclosed backyard.182 The state court found the surveillance to violate the
Fourth Amendment, since the yard, “immediately surrounding and associated
with the home,” clearly qualified as curtilage.183 But the Supreme Court
reversed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger agreed that Ciraolo’s
marijuana plants fell within the curtilage, but he concluded that their
exposure to commercial airplanes overhead meant that Ciraolo could harbor
no reasonable privacy expectations against aerial surveillance of that
property.184 Dissenting, Justice Powell questioned Burger’s premise that the
land was truly visible to commercial travelers.185 But he also emphasized a fact
he saw as lost within the record: in addition to marijuana plants, Ciraolo’s
yard featured several domestic improvements, including “a swimming pool
and a patio for sunbathing and other private activities.”186 Setting aside

180 This is a qualitatively different move than that traced in the previous section—one that
does not concern the metric through which the Court evaluates private conduct, but rather the
specificity with which it does so in a given case.
181 See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
182 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
183 People v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)), rev’d, 476 U.S. 207.
184 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
185 Id. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he actual risk to privacy from commercial or
pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent.”).
186 Id. at 222 n.7.
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Ciraolo’s risk of exposure, Justice Powell suggested, the domestic nature of
his property should have swayed the outcome of the case.
Justice Powell’s suggestion was largely speculative, but the Court’s subsequent
curtilage decisions have largely borne it out. Issued the same day as Ciraolo, the
Court’s opinion in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States presented a foil of sorts to
the Court’s curtilage cases, holding that the enclosed space surrounding a
commercial plant—so-called “industrial curtilage”—deserved reduced
protections against aerial photography as a space unrelated to the “intimate
activities associated with family privacy.”187 Even on industrial property, however,
the Court qualified that aerial surveillance through more sophisticated equipment
capable of “revealing . . . intimate details” might yet “raise constitutional
concerns.”188 Presumably, the “intimate” details of a chemical plant differed from
the intimacies of the domestic hearth, yet Dow confirmed that a party’s privacy
rights against aerial surveillance did not depend simply on the site or nature of the
government’s tactics. They also depended on the information revealed.
Three years later, the Court extended that discriminating logic to its conclusion.
In Florida v. Riley, officers flying a helicopter 400 feet over the defendant’s yard
observed marijuana plants through the roof of a covered greenhouse.189 Finding
that the structure stood within the defendant’s curtilage, the state courts held that
the surveillance violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy.190 Aerial
observation of such domestic spaces, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized, “lays
open everything and everyone below—whether marijuana plants, nude sunbathers,
or family members relaxing in their lawn chairs.”191
In a split opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. A plurality led by Justice
White reasoned that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
against aerial surveillance conducted from legally navigable airspace—in the
case of helicopters, essentially any airspace.192 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
and a four-person dissent, cobbling together a technical majority, rejected such
positivist reasoning and instead defined the critical inquiry as whether public air
travel is “sufficiently routine” to raise a genuine risk of exposure.193 Even the
plurality, however, acknowledged certain limits on surveillance from legal airspace.
If government agents “interfered with [the owner]’s normal use” of his land, or
caused “undue noise, . . . wind, dust, or threat of injury,” or if they observed any
187
188
189
190

476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986).
Id. at 238.
488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff ’d, 511 So. 2d 282, 288
(Fla. 1987), and rev’d, 488 U.S. 445.
191 Riley, 511 So. 2d at 287.
192 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
193 Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added); see id. at 460
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (asking “whether public observation” was “commonplace”).
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“intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage,” such
surveillance might trigger Fourth Amendment protections.194
Justice Brennan’s dissent seized on the “intimate details” exception—the
only one that did not effectively map onto the common law of property rights.
“If the police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard
greenhouse,” he marveled, “would we then say that his reasonable expectation
of privacy had been infringed? Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases
is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed must
be ‘intimate’ in order to be protected by the Constitution?”195 Yet Justice
Brennan’s gloss of the Court’s precedent was somewhat dated. By the time of
Riley, the Court had published numerous cases characterizing the Fourth
Amendment as “intended to shelter” intimate domestic pursuits.196 Disinclined
to extend Fourth Amendment protections to the defendant’s pot-filled
greenhouse but also unwilling to sanction all low-altitude surveillance of
domestic spaces, the Riley plurality echoed those cases in suggesting that more
valuable social activities, even in similar areas, give rise to greater privacy rights.
State and lower federal courts have taken Justice White’s exceptions seriously.
Injecting the Riley dicta into the center of their Fourth Amendment analysis,
most courts now hold that aerial surveillance is constitutionally permissible only
in the absence of certain aggravating factors, including safety hazards, excessive
noise or disruption, and, in many cases, exposure of “intimate details.”197 In some
jurisdictions, in short, the test derived from the Court’s aerial surveillance cases
194
195
196

Id. at 451-52 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
301 (1987) (identifying whether an area is “intimately tied to the home” as the “centrally relevant consideration”
in assigning Fourth Amendment protection); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (“[T]he home
is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants’ possessory interests in the
premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activities that take place within.”).
197 E.g., United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding a property
owner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in part because the police did not “observe[]
intimate details”); United States v. Allerheiligen, Nos. 99-3144 & 99-3154, 2000 WL 1055487, at *4
(10th Cir. 2000) (same); People v. McKim, 263 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (Ct. App. 1989); Commonwealth v.
Robbins, 647 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 478 (Vt. 2008)
(emphasizing the exposure of “intimate activities”).
Depending on the records or parties’ arguments, some courts have incorporated the Riley aggravating
factors into their analysis without discussing intimacy specifically. E.g., Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383,
389-90 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation due to noise, wind, and interference);
State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1171 (N.M. 2015) (same); see also Doggett v. State, 791 So. 2d 1043, 1056 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000) (discussing noise, wind, and disturbance). Others take a more conservative approach,
asking only whether the surveillance occurred at a legally permissible altitude. See, e.g., State v. Little, 918
N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation because the police helicopter
was “illegally in restricted airspace”); see also United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1986);
State v. Wilson, 988 P.2d 463, 465 (Wash. App. 1999). Still others ask, per Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,
whether overhead flights are foreseeable. See, e.g., United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 434-35 (4th Cir.
2002); Commonwealth v. One 1985 Ford Thunderbird Auto., 624 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass. 1993).
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holds that intimate activities on even traditionally protected land deserve
greater Fourth Amendment protections than less savory or illicit acts. This rule
does not examine an individual’s activities to decide whether a given space
should be classified as “curtilage,” nor does it distinguish among surveillance
tactics more or less likely to uncover intimate acts. Rather, it ties an individual’s
entitlement to privacy on her domestic land to the value of her conduct there.
The superior status of “intimate” pursuits under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is borne out by the federal courts’ applications of Dow and Riley
beyond the context of curtilage, to technologies reaching into the home itself.
The most commonly litigated technology, thermal imaging, reached six
circuit courts over the course of the 1990s. Five ultimately approved the
practice, and all five explained their holdings at least partly—and in some
cases entirely—based on the “intimacy” of the details revealed.198 Drawing
on Riley and Dow, as well as on ostensibly probabilistic cases like Smith, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits explicitly concluded that “the crucial inquiry . . . in
any search and seizure analysis” is “whether the technology reveals ‘intimate
details.’”199 Thermal imaging did not offend the Fourth Amendment because
it revealed no “intimate details of [the defendant’s] life”—and especially, the
Ninth Circuit went to great lengths to establish, not any sexual activity in the
home—but only “amorphous ‘hot spots.’”200 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
cited Supreme Court cases like Dow as establishing that “the intimacy of
detail [i]s relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes,” concluding that thermal
imaging raises no constitutional concerns because it is “incapable of revealing
the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth Amendment.”201
Persistently distinguishing between intimate and non-intimate activities, the
Supreme Court’s precedent has thus led lower courts to withhold
198 See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United
States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056,
1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit initially found thermal imaging to be a search, specifically
denying any distinction between “intimate or other[]” activities, but later vacated the opinion en banc.
See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (1996), vacated, 83 F.3d 1247 (1996).
199 Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986));
accord Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046-47 (quoting Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855).
200 Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047. The first time Kyllo reached the Ninth Circuit, the court remanded the case
for further factfinding as to whether the device could “detect sexual activity in the bedroom.” United States v.
Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1994). The second time Kyllo reached the Ninth Circuit, the court found the
device to qualify as a search on the grounds that it was sophisticated enough to reveal “two commingled objects
emitting heat in a bedroom at night.” United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir. 1998). On rehearing,
the court reversed itself in deference to the district court’s contrary factual findings. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047.
201 Ford, 34 F.3d at 996. The remaining circuits, the Seventh and Eighth, primarily held that heat
waves were “waste products” creating no privacy interests, but also emphasized that they do not implicate
the “intimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy” that “form the basis for” Fourth Amendment protections.
Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59; accord Myers, 46 F.3d at 669-70 (quoting Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59).
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constitutional protections even in the home—that inner sanctum of the
Fourth Amendment—for insufficiently valuable information.
In Kyllo v. United States in 2001, the Supreme Court itself rejected that
reasoning, in an opinion that conspicuously broke with Katz’s privacy
framework. Scorning the “circular” and “subjective” nature of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, Justice Scalia insisted that the “minimal expectation
of privacy” long established by Fourth Amendment caselaw “draws ‘a firm line
at the entrance to the house.’”202 Kyllo is often remembered primarily for Justice
Scalia’s aside about the lady’s “daily sauna and bath,” so vividly evoking the
intimacies of the marital hearth.203 Yet in fact, Justice Scalia decried lower courts’
attempts to distinguish among intimate and impersonal information. “In the
home,” he insisted, “all details are intimate details,” from the rug in the vestibule
to the can of ether in the hallway, simply because “they [a]re the details of the
home.”204 Any rare sense-enhancing technology used to obtain any information
“that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical” intrusion of the
house, he concluded, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.205
Against the incursions of the lower courts, in short, Kyllo resuscitated the
home’s protections against thermal imaging based on a deeply property-based
construction of the Fourth Amendment. Dismissing the significance of
“intimacy” to its constitutional analysis, it reversed the corrosive effects of the
reasonable expectation of privacy framework by eschewing that framework in
favor of a trespass-based approach. Yet while Kyllo has exempted the interior of
the home from any Fourth Amendment inquiries into the intimacy of a
defendant’s activities, it has not overruled or even meaningfully altered the
framework that precipitated them: the principle derived from Doe and Riley, and
still commonly applied by lower courts, that an individual’s privacy against
surveillance on his curtilage depends on the acts for which that right is claimed.
In this sense, Kyllo does not resolve but casts in clearer relief the doctrinal stakes
of the Court’s aerial surveillance cases: the suggestion that an individual’s privacy
interests under the Fourth Amendment reflect the value of the conduct involved.
B. Visitors in the Home
In one’s own home, the Fourth Amendment draws a “firm line” at the
door. And even the formal definition of curtilage evaluates an individual’s
uses of a given space prospectively.

202 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 37 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980)).
203 Id. at 44.
204 Id. at 37-38.
205 Id. at 34.
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In one arena, however, the Court has explicitly recognized that an individual’s
privacy expectations may depend on how he or she actually uses the setting. As
Justice Marshall recognized in an early dissent, the Court looks beyond “the sorts
of uses to which a given space is susceptible” and examines how “the person
asserting an expectation of privacy . . . [is] in fact employing it” when that
individual “lack[s] primary control” over the space: that is, when that individual
is a guest on a third party’s property.206 In such cases, the Court since Katz has
not only sanctioned a retrospective analysis of a visitor’s activities in her host’s
home, but has also explicitly tied her privacy rights to the social value of her visit.
The Court first suggested that reasonable privacy expectations may depend
on “the way a person has used a location” in Rakas v. Illinois, a 1978 case denying
a passenger’s Fourth Amendment interests in a friend’s vehicle.207 That case
credited the proposition to the 1960 case Jones v. United States, which held that
a defendant staying overnight at a friend’s apartment was “legitimately on
premises” and therefore could challenge a warrantless search.208 Reevaluating
Jones in light of Katz’s privacy framework, the Court in Rakas recharacterized
the heart of that decision not as the defendant’s “legitimate” status but as his
authority over the apartment.209 The defendant in Jones had a reasonable
expectation of privacy because he possessed a house key and commonly stored
belongings in the home, giving him “complete dominion and control over the
apartment.”210 Recalling the probabilistic view of Katz, Jones’s “use” of his
friend’s apartment bore on his privacy interests simply in the sense that more
extended visits justify greater confidence in anticipating seclusion.
When the Court next revisited the Fourth Amendment rights of visitors, it
adopted a more normative approach. In Minnesota v. Olson in 1990, the Court
held that overnight guests share a reasonable expectation of privacy in their host’s
home based not on the exclusive nature of their visit, but rather on its social
importance. 211 Although the Court noted that overnight visitors typically wield
some “measure of control” over a home, the Court emphasized that this power is
not determinative of their Fourth Amendment rights.212 Rather, overnight guests
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because “[s]taying overnight in another’s
home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable
by society.”213 As the Court elaborated, “[w]e stay in others’ homes when we
travel to a strange city, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 191 n.13 (1984).
439 U.S. 128, 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
See id. at 140-43 (majority opinion) (citing 362 U.S. 257, 259-67).
Id. at 149.
Id.
495 U.S. 91, 98-99.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 98.
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relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit
for a friend.”214 A visitor’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a host’s home, in
short, reflected the centrality of overnight visits as a social practice.
In subsequent years, lower courts adopted Olson’s exaltation of social value at
the center of Fourth Amendment protections. Some imported that language
directly into the Katz privacy test, rewriting Katz’s second prong as asking whether
an individual’s privacy expectation advances “longstanding social customs that
serve functions recognized as valuable by society.”215 Others explicitly based
Fourth Amendment protections for short-term visitors on the moral value of their
visits. The Fourth Circuit, for example, extended Olson to an afternoon visitor who
commonly ran errands for her neighbor, reasoning that “visiting a neighbor and
assisting the elderly” are activities that “establish an expectation of privacy that is
‘recognized and permitted by society.’”216 A California court recognized the
privacy rights of a visitor watching a sleeping child, both because babysitters have
authority over a home and because “babysitting ‘is a longstanding social custom
that serves functions recognized as valuable by society.’”217 By contrast, the D.C.
Circuit denied Fourth Amendment protections to a defendant using a friend’s
apartment to sell drugs, “[q]uite the opposite” of a “longstanding social custom
that serves functions recognized as valuable by society.”218
When the Supreme Court itself examined the Fourth Amendment rights
of short-term visitors, it followed that same path. In Minnesota v. Carter, the
Court denied any reasonable expectation of privacy for two defendants
observed bagging cocaine in a recent acquaintance’s apartment.219 Noting that
the defendants used the apartment “simply [as] a place to do business,” the
Court concluded that the “purely commercial nature” of their visit, the
“relatively short period of time” they spent there, and “the lack of any
previous connection between respondents and the householder” undercut any
reasonable privacy interests in the home.220 Justice Kennedy, the necessary
fifth vote, wrote separately to emphasize the narrow contours of the decision.
Carter, he insisted, preserved Fourth Amendment protections for “most, if
not all, social guests,” for even assuming that an individual must “establish a
214
215

Id.
E.g., State v. Stephenson, 760 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); accord State v. Ortiz,
618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 2000).
216 Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 100).
217 People v. Moreno, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66, 70 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
218 United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
219 525 U.S. 83, 85 (1998). In earlier proceedings, the state supreme court had conceded that
“society does not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine,” but nevertheless found a Fourth
Amendment based on a homeowner’s broader right “to invite persons into the privacy of their
home[].” State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1997), rev’d, 525 U.S. 83.
220 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91.
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meaningful connection to [a homeowner’s] apartment,” wide-ranging social
customs mean that “as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of
privacy in their host’s home.”221 And even in business-related visits, Justice
Kennedy suggested, relationships of greater respect and reciprocity—involving
“confidential communications” rather than “the mechanical act of chopping
and packing”—might merit greater constitutional protections.222
As the dissent noted, such distinctions went against the precedent of Katz
itself, which protected the defendant’s privacy in a public phonebooth despite his
commercial, illicit conversations there—and despite the fact that Katz, too, raised
difficult questions of standing on a third party’s property.223 Yet those distinctions
should not sound unfamiliar. Perhaps not coincidentally, the types of privacy
interests singled out for greater solicitude under Carter recall those interpersonal
relationships deserving constitutional privacy under the Due Process Clause. As
articulated by both the majority and Justice Kennedy, the Fourth Amendment
protects visits that reflect some “meaningful connection” among the parties, but
not those that are “purely commercial,” last a “relatively short period of time,” or
entail no deeper “connection”224—in Justice Kennedy’s words, those that are
“fleeting,” “insubstantial,” and devoid of “meaning[].”225 These limitations map
uncannily onto the reasoning behind Lawrence’s protections of adult consensual
sex, which aimed primarily to safeguard “enduring” bonds226 and may preclude,
for example, constitutional rights for commercial sex of any kind.227 As in the
Court’s due process privacy cases, Carter attaches constitutional “privacy” only to
those relationships that satisfy the Court’s view of valuable personal relations.
In the years since Carter, state and lower federal courts have consistently
extended greater Fourth Amendment protections to social rather than business
guests. Some have hewn closely to the Kennedy concurrence, holding that all social
guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their host’s home.228 Yet most
stop short, disaggregating the realm of the social into more and less worthy
221 Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Between Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters, a
majority of the Justices supported that baseline. See id. at 109 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 110-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Indeed, at least one scholar has argued that Katz was animated
by concerns about police surveillance of gay cruising in public bathrooms—certainly something that the Court
of 1967 did not see as socially valuable activity. See generally David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide
Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008).
224 Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
225 Id. at 101-02 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
227 See RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW 587 (1999); Kristian
R. Mukoski, The Constraint of Dignity: Lawrence v. Texas and Public Morality, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 451, 471 (2013).
228 E.g., Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. 1999); In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658
N.W.2d 565, 576 (Minn. 2003); State v. Earl, 92 P.3d 167, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); cf. State v.
Trecroci, 630 N.W.2d 555, 569-70 (Wis. 2001).
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relationships.229 Those inquiries proceed along roughly two lines. Some courts have
resurrected Jones’s inquiry into an individual’s dominion over a given space, denying
even acknowledged social guests Fourth Amendment protections unless they
somehow control access to the home.230 More commonly, courts have evaluated the
meaningfulness of a social guest’s relationship with the host, considering such
factors as her intimacy with the family, the frequency and length of their
interactions, and the absence of any illicit or commercial purposes for her visit.231
Under this second approach, a visitor’s Fourth Amendment rights often
depend on a court’s assessment of the possibility of meaningful relationships
involving illegal or commercial dealings.232 Take two cases decided roughly
within a year of each other: In one, a Tennessee district court concluded that a
defendant visiting a friend’s apartment to “manufacture and supply
methamphetamine” had a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was there
not “purely for commercial purposes,” but also to serve “a mutual addiction.”233
By contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court denied a Fourth Amendment claim where
the defendant and his hostess met repeatedly “to use drugs . . . and to ‘hang out,’”
eventually engaging in a three-day binge where guests and family members used
and bought drugs, “some of which” the defendant provided.234 The defendant’s
“substantial” drug sales, the court reasoned, revealed the gathering to be “an
ongoing drug transaction” rather than a social gathering.235 Beyond its inherent
subjectivity, the court’s analysis reflected some very class-based priors: the
presumption that a sale of valuable goods, as opposed to the generosity of a gift,
undermines the depth of a personal relationship. If the Court’s valorization of
“intimate” relations seemed to at least leave room for individuals to pick their
229 Some cases have characterized these distinctions as differentiating among admitted social guests,
e.g., United States v. Rose, 613 F. App’x 125, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032,
1035-36 (10th Cir. 2011), while others characterize them as going to the preliminary question of whether a
visitor should be termed a “social guest.” E.g., United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003);
State v. Tullous, 692 N.W.2d 790, 794 (S.D. 2005). Regardless, the inquiries are essentially equivalent.
230 E.g., Rose, 613 F. App’x at 129-30; City of Champaign v. Torres, 824 N.E.2d 624, 631 (Ill. 2005);
State v. Filion, 966 A.2d 405, 408-09 (Me. 2004); State v. Smith, 97 P.3d 567, 570 (Mont. 2004).
231 E.g., United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kuenstler, 325
F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2003); Rhiger, 315 F.3d at 1287; State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 564 (Iowa 2004);
State v. Talkington, 345 P.3d 258, 277 (Kan. 2015); State v. Link, 150 P.3d 610, 615-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
232 See Talkington, 345 P.3d at 277 (emphasizing the commercial nature of a visit in declining to find
a reasonable expectation of privacy, despite an established prior friendship with the host); Earl, 92 P.3d at
172-73 (same). Compare, e.g., State v. Sefcik, No. 02-1801, 2004 WL 149958, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2004) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy where drug use was “incidental” to friendly gathering),
with United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying a reasonable expectation of privacy
where the defendant arrived at another’s apartment with alcohol and ice, but also sold drugs), and State v.
Sletten, 664 N.W.2d 870, 877-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (denying a reasonable expectation of privacy where
the defendant bought drugs at another’s home, despite “friendly” relations with host).
233 United States v. Smith, No. 01-044, 2001 WL 1898404, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 2001).
234 State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 2000).
235 Id. at 560.
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preferred brands of intimacy, such cases exemplify how easily protections may be
limited to a narrow class of orthodox, and culturally specific, arrangements.
Similarly, a visitor’s reasonable expectations of privacy frequently depend on
whether his personal connection to the host conforms to the structures of
conventionally prized relationships. Numerous cases devolve into subjective,
value-laden inquiries into the point at which a social acquaintance qualifies as
“meaningful”: years of duration, shared recreational activities, and the like.236 The
subjectivity of that approach, as well as its latent cultural biases, emerges
strikingly in cases involving sexual relations. One New York district court, for
example, has reasoned that a defendant who repeatedly visited his mistress’s hotel
room had no reasonable expectations of privacy, since he never spent the night
and his visits were not “extended.”237 A Maryland court has held that a visitor
present for a sexual encounter had no privacy rights where the sex was offered
for money and was not part of an “ongoing ‘boyfriend and girlfriend’
relationship.”238 When one Wisconsin court held that an ongoing sexual
relationship gave the defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy in his lover’s
home, the dissent protested extending constitutional protections to “occasional
sexual contacts” between two persons who are “not married, nor even engaged.”239
As these cases demonstrate, the constitutional framework that has
emerged from the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on
home visitors is a deeply retrospective and judgmental inquiry. Protecting
overnight visitors due to the customary value of their visits, while separating
shorter-term visitors into privileged “social” guests or mere business visitors,
the Supreme Court has consistently tied individuals’ reasonable expectations
of privacy to its assessment of the value of their visit. And lower courts have
parsed even finer distinctions, debating whether drug sales transform a group
gathering from a “social” to a “commercial” transaction, or whether casual
sexual encounters, or those involving monetary exchange, qualify as social
relations worth protecting. Beginning with Olson and culminating in Carter,
Fourth Amendment rights for visitors have centered on a court’s normative
appraisals of particular social, commercial, and even romantic arrangements.

236 A “years”-long friendship certainly qualifies, see United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 647
(6th Cir. 2000); Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. 1999), as does a foregoing
relationship coupled with “social interaction[s]” like “talking and watching television,” In re Welfare
of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 574 (Minn. 2003), while mere evidence of watching television together
does not. State v. Jones, 845 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
237 United States v. Cody, 434 F. Supp. 2d 157, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
238 Simpson v. State, 708 A.2d 1126, 1135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). In notable contrast,
California’s exaltation of babysitting as a “valuable” social custom did not distinguish between free
and paid services. See supra text accompanying note 217.
239 State v. Moss, No. 00-3506-CR, 2001 WL 1634442, at *10 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2001)
(Roggensack, J.).
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C. Dog Sniffs and Drug Tests
A general rule of the Fourth Amendment is that courts may draw no
distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy” possessions.240 What a man has
hidden from view, whether “in his desk drawer, or in his pocket,” must remain
free from search.241 Yet in a series of cases involving drug-sniffing dogs and
chemical tests, the Supreme Court has established that individuals have no
legitimate expectations in the possession of certain contraband items—even in
traditionally protected spaces, and no matter how discreetly they are stored.
The Court first premiered this novel doctrine in United States v. Place in 1983.242
After the defendant challenged the state’s use of drug-sniffing dogs in airports, the
government asked the Court to recognize canine sniffs as a type of “investigative
stop”—a minimal intrusion justifiable based on reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause.243 The Court ultimately did not need to reach that issue,244 but in
dicta it did the government one better. Because a dog sniff “discloses only the
presence or absence of . . . a contraband item” and entails no physical intrusion into
one’s effects, Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority, it simply does “not constitute
a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”245
A year later, the Court turned that dicta into holding in United States v. Jacobsen,
a case that involved not canine sniffs but chemical drug tests.246 In dismissing the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge to a chemical test of a mailed package,
Justice Stevens conceded that “sealed packages are in the general class of effects”
protected by the Fourth Amendment, accessible by police only with a warrant.247
Yet even as it concerned those protected objects, he concluded, a test “that merely
discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine” does not trigger the
Fourth Amendment.248 In light of Congress’s clear judgment, reflected in the
nation’s numerous narcotics laws, that any “interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine
[i]s illegitimate,” an individual simply had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his possession of illicit drugs.249 Jacobsen thus conflated an individual’s lack of a
legitimate interest in possessing materials under the criminal law with a lack of
legitimate interest in the privacy of those materials under the Fourth Amendment.
Justices Brennan and Marshall protested this “startling” vision of Fourth
Amendment rights, based on “the nature of the information . . . rather than
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
462 U.S. 696.
Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 707.
466 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1984).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 123.
Id.

2018]

Fourth Amendment Moralism

1231

on the context in which . . . [it] is concealed.”250 While agreeing that tests
disclosing only the presence of contraband are “less intrusive” than many
other invasions, Justice Brennan cautioned that such selective investigative
techniques may nevertheless intrude on spaces guarded by the Fourth
Amendment.251 By the majority’s reasoning, after all, even a drug test
revealing narcotics inside a home—that most sacred of all Fourth
Amendment settings—would steer clear of constitutional challenge.252
In the proliferation of state challenges against canine drug sniffs following
Jacobsen, most courts sided with the dissent. Adjudicating claims brought
under the states’ search-and-seizure provisions—commonly interpreted to
align with their federal counterpart—the vast majority of courts have held that
canine sniff tests qualify as searches, either in all cases253 or at the very least
when targeting privileged zones like the home.254 While acknowledging the
minimal invasiveness of dog sniffs, state courts typically incorporate that fact
through other means, most typically by subjecting canine sniffs to the lowered
standard of “reasonable suspicion” rather than a warrant requirement.255 And
even then, some courts set higher bars for what they see as uniquely invasive
applications, such as dog sniffs targeting persons256 or homes.257
Yet the Supreme Court has continued to expand its reasoning in Jacobsen.
In 2005, the Court in Illinois v. Caballes confirmed that police may perform
dog sniffs on an individual’s car even absent suspicion that the driver is
harboring contraband.258 Because “any interest in possessing contraband
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’” it repeated, “governmental conduct that only
reveals the possession of contraband” implicates “no legitimate privacy
interest.”259 The Court expressly distinguished canine drug tests from the
thermal imaging device involved in Kyllo. In that case, Justice Scalia had
refused to tie Fourth Amendment protections to the “intimate” nature of the
data revealed, noting as an aside that intimacy also provided a poor proxy for
250
251
252
253

Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.
E.g., Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d
710, 716 (N.H. 1990); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1190 (Pa. 2004). But see State v. Waz,
692 A.2d 1217, 1223 (Conn. 1997) (collecting cases holding that canine sniffs in airports are not
searches under state constitutions).
254 E.g., State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181-82 (Minn. 2007); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054,
1057-58 (N.Y. 1990); cf. State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 823 (Neb. 1999) (holding that a canine sniff
of a home is a “search” under both the state and federal constitutions).
255 See Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1022 (Md. 2004) (collecting cases).
256 Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993) (requiring probable cause instead
of Pennsylvania’s general reasonable suspicion requirement).
257 State v. Dearman, 962 P.2d 850, 853-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring a warrant).
258 543 U.S. 405, 408-09.
259 Id. at 408.
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the sophistication of police techniques: a primitive scanner could reveal such
details as the “hour [of] night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and
bath” while more advanced devices disclosed no more than a burning
lightbulb.260 In Caballes, the Court remembered Kyllo somewhat differently.
The key to that decision, the majority now insisted, was not neutrality toward
the information revealed, nor even the unique sanctity of the home, but “the
fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity”—“intimate
details” like the lady’s sauna and bath.261 By this reasoning, it did not matter
that the officers in Caballes, as in Kyllo, used a rare investigative tool to reveal
information that “could not otherwise have been obtained without physical”
intrusion.262 Due to the uniquely unworthy nature of that information, even
a traditionally protected space raised no reasonable expectation of privacy.
That same reasoning appears to extend even to the inviolable boundaries of
the home. In Florida v. Jardines, an unusual coalition of the Court upheld the
suppression of evidence obtained through a preliminary dog sniff on a suspect’s
porch.263 Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor would have held that the dog
sniff violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy under Kyllo,264
but they could not get two more votes. Instead, the three signed on to an opinion
by Justice Scalia that resolved the case purely on trespass grounds: the fact that
the police physically entered the defendant’s curtilage.265 The remaining Justices
objected that the officers’ actions on Jardines’s porch were neither a trespass nor,
per Caballes, a violation of any reasonable privacy interests.266 Even within the
home, in short, six justices declined to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the possession of drugs, and four explicitly denied that claim.
Throughout the Court’s dog-sniff and drug-test cases, of course, the explicit
distinction has been between “contraband” and “non-contraband”—between
differing legal rather than moral statuses. Yet there is reason to doubt that such
cases revolve purely on that technical distinction. First, it is difficult to
disaggregate criminal prohibitions against the private possession of narcotics
from quintessential moral judgments, aimed at policing lifestyles rather than
protecting public welfare.267 The history of many such laws, including the
260 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001). The Kyllo majority rejected the dissent’s
objection that technology identifying “criminal conduct and nothing else” is not a search. Id. at 48
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
262 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
263 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
264 Id. at 14-15 (Kagan, J., concurring).
265 Id. at 6-9 (majority opinion). Characteristically, Justice Scalia avoided any romantic definitions
of curtilage based on “intimate activity,” relying instead on its proximity to the home. Id. at 6-7.
266 Id. at 21-24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
267 See Michèle Alexandre, Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll and Moral Dirigisme: Toward a Reformation of Drug
and Prostitution Regulations, 78 UMKC L. REV. 101, 113-14 (2009) (“More than the fear of actual physical
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contemporary trends toward decriminalizing marijuana, as well as the nation’s
short-lived experiment with Prohibition, confirms their tendencies to stand
in for the shifting tides of moral opinion.268
More to the point, it is difficult to conceive of the Court applying its
reasoning in Jacobsen to numerous other criminal prohibitions. The possibility
is far from fanciful, but take for the time being a thought experiment drawn
from the Court’s existing cases: Imagine that the police prior to Griswold had
obtained a radar that scanned neighborhoods and informed them, with perfect
accuracy and precision, when a married couple was engaging—or agreeing to
engage—in sexual intercourse involving contraceptives.269 Or that the police
prior to Lawrence obtained the same device for same-sex sodomy. The radar
reveals no other information about the home, nor further details of the
intercourse; the data disclosed, in short, is coextensive with the fact of a
criminal violation. (Or, to the extent that it does reveal something
additional—not just that the couple is violating the law, but also where and
when—that surplus knowledge is entirely consistent with Jacobsen and Caballes.)
Would the Court, in either its current composition or any other, be prepared to
say that the radar has not violated a reasonable expectation of privacy? In Griswold,
the Court concluded that the sacred “privacy” of marital relations prevented the
police from investigating a couple’s sexual acts even armed with a warrant.270 Would
the Court now hold that police officers who obtain information about a couple’s
sexual acts in their home absent a warrant do not engage in any “search” so long as
they learn nothing but the fact (and setting and timing) of the encounter itself?271
It may be tempting to reject the premise that such a device reveals “only”
the fact of criminality. Defenders of the binary search, after all, emphasize
the limited nature of the information disclosed: nothing, they insist, but

damages . . . our obstinacy in [criminalizing drug possession] . . . seems to stem from moral justifications.”);
Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause
Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 397 (1984) (“Drug laws are often considered a form of morality legislation.”).
268 See also Albert DiChiara & Jon F. Galliher, Dissonance and Contradictions in the Origins of
Marihuana Decriminalization, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41, 44-45 (1994); Erik Luna, Drug
Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2002) (“As was true at the height of the Temperance
Movement, morality has won out over privacy and autonomy in society’s current drug war.”).
269 Cf. Loewy, supra note 76, at 1244 (imagining a device that guides police solely to evidence
of wrongdoing).
270 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213 n.7 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (identifying
as “[o]ne of the reasons” for Griswold “the possibility, and repugnancy, of permitting [even
warranted] searches to obtain evidence regarding the use of contraceptives”).
271 See United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the presumption
that sexual activities “take place in private absent a valid warrant legitimizing their observation”),
superseded by 190 F.3d 1041 (1991), and rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Cloud, supra note 25, at 255
(suggesting that, per Court precedent, Oliver might have come out differently if it involved not
drugs but “sexual behavior in some open field”).
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criminal guilt.272 The mere knowledge that a couple is engaging in
contracepted intercourse or same-sex sodomy may seem to open a deeper
window into their household, including the fact of their active sexual life,
their sexual or romantic preferences, their desire (or lack thereof) for a child.
The fact of criminality here touches on more profound components of
domestic and sexual life, recognized by the Court to have deep social value.
If the possession of illegal drugs in Jacobsen or Caballes does not seem to open
a similarly sensitive window, however, it is only because we do not consider the
possession of drugs an equally valuable or meaningful life choice. Like these
other searches, binary drug tests reveal a swath of subsidiary information about
the target: what type of narcotics the defendant prefers, where and when he
carries them, how he transports them. Any distinction between the scenarios
above and Caballes essentially comes down to a subjective judgment about the
centrality of narcotics to personal identity and fulfillment.273 Far from simply
respecting the formalities of the criminal code, in short, the Court’s exemption
of “contraband” from the Fourth Amendment reflects the intrinsic valuelessness
of the criminalized activity: the Court’s assumption that drugs, unlike more
intimate conduct, implicate no zone of human existence worth protecting.
*

*

*

The debate over morality in the Court’s constitutional privacy cases, a
pervasive theme since the 1960s, may thus not be pervasive enough. In addition
to substantive doctrines like due process privacy, the Fourth Amendment—that
ostensibly procedural limit on state action—has commonly defined the
contours of personal privacy rights around the value of an individual’s conduct.
272 See David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
43 n.240 (1996) (describing correspondence with Christopher Slobogin suggesting that a device
revealing “only contraband” would not constitute a search); Kenneth J. Melilli, Dog Sniffs, Technology,
and the Mythical Constitutional Right to Criminal Privacy, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 376-77 (2014)
(noting that the “drug dog simply indicates a ‘yes or no’ to the question of the presence of illegal drugs”);
Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 881, 920 (2014) (arguing that the rationale for protecting privacy “loses its force precisely
because binary searches disclose no more than the presence of absence of contraband”); see also
Simmons, supra note 79, at 1348 (defining “binary” searches as those “designed in such a way that the
only result of the investigation is information about whether contraband or illegal activity is present”).
273 Some commentators have thus characterized binary searches not as revealing no “legitimate”
data, but rather as “compromis[ing] no interest of law-abiders.” Rosenthal, supra note 272, at 929; see
also Harris, supra note 272, at 43 n.240 (noting LaFave’s argument that binary searches do not intrude
on the “innocent,” but “have negative consequences only for those” violating a particular prohibition).
This reasoning essentially isolates lawbreakers into a separate category of constitutional subjects,
categorically entitled to less privacy from the state—akin to the “innocence theory” endorsed by some
but never recognized as reflecting Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 9, at
1476-85 (proposing that the Fourth Amendment should be “concerned exclusively with protecting the
innocent from invasions of privacy”). See generally Loewy, supra note 76.
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From its assessment of “reasonableness” on the basis of the activities housed at
a given site, to its identification of “intimacy” as the core value sheltered by the
Fourth Amendment, to its explicitly retrospective frameworks surrounding
aerial surveillance, home visitors, and drug tests, the Court has repeatedly tied
Fourth Amendment privacy rights to the social worth of an individual’s
actions—not simply the legality but the morality of her acts.
This moralistic analysis upends prevailing accounts of the Fourth Amendment
as a provision tending solely to the circumstances, not the fruit, of a police
intrusion. Far from remaining blind to a defendant’s conduct, the Fourth
Amendment frequently allots privacy rights by examining the activities involved
in any case. And it appraises those activities not by privileging uniquely “private”
information, but on the basis of distinctly communitarian judgments about
personal and social flourishing—favoring domestic or interpersonal arrangements
that are “intimate,”274 “meaningful,”275 or otherwise “recognized as valuable by
society.”276 The Fourth Amendment’s normative commitments, by this view, are
not simply a matter of deciding what type of state we want our neighbors to live
in. They are a matter of deciding what types of lives we want our neighbors to live.
Scholars in recent years have critiqued the broad enterprise of individual
“rights,” from property to religious liberty to international human rights, as
an ostensibly liberal project that in fact bleeds into a form of social ordering.
Individual rights, they argue, frequently endorse desired social arrangements
and cultural practices,277 entrenching dominant economic regimes278 or
imposing prevailing (commonly Christian) views of moral order.279
The Court’s Katz analysis over the past decades furthers that account,
demonstrating the regulatory potential of even provisions formally aimed at
erecting purely procedural limits on state power—those we would most
expect to function as traditional negative liberties free from substantive
coercion. In the aftermath of the Court’s individualistic reasoning in Roe,
philosopher Michael Sandel warned that the Court’s constitutional privacy
jurisprudence was coming to embody a “procedural republic,” privileging
274 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
275 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
277 See COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE (2007); SAMUEL MOYN,
CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 8-13 (2015) (arguing that “human rights” naturalize dominant
socioeconomic and political structures); see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV.

1363, 1379-80 (1984) (arguing that any specification of rights entails a choice of social order).
278 See Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW, 645, 645-59 (David Kairys ed., 1998) (reviewing literature examining how rights-based
protections reinforce capitalist markets).
279 See MOYN, supra note 277, at 8-12 (arguing that human rights regimes impose Christian
values); Saba Mahmood & Peter G. Danchin, Politics of Religious Freedom, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 1,
4-7 (2014) (reviewing scholarship).
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pluralism, moral relativity, and individualism over substantive virtue.280 The
history of Fourth Amendment privacy suggests that the Court is not capable
of erecting a procedural republic even in a purely procedural amendment.
IV. AGAINST FOURTH AMENDMENT MORALISM
What should we make of the Court’s moralistic approach to reasonable
expectations of privacy since Katz?
The moral reasoning in the Court’s due process privacy jurisprudence has
inspired generations of debate.281 Some scholars denounce that trend,
insisting that any “fundamental” rights recognized under an essentially
antimajoritarian Constitution must be free from the contours of
communitarian approval.282 Others suggest that the controversial nature of
substantive due process, as an unenumerated limit on state power, requires
judges to legitimate that doctrine through appeals to prevailing social
norms.283 Others conclude the doctrine inevitably comes down to the court’s
subjective policy preferences, and so is intrinsically illegitimate.284
In practice if not in theory, however, scholars tend to agree that due process
privacy requires some normative judgments about the activities involved. Since
substantive liberties necessarily attach to particular acts, and since a less
discriminating approach would undercut the states’ established police powers, due
process privacy forces the Court to consider and choose among the precise acts for
280
281

SANDEL, supra note 63, at 27-28; see also id. at 157.
The nonmoralistic zone of privacy announced in Stanley has engendered little controversy,
comporting with the prevailing view of the First Amendment as safeguarding dissent from
majoritarian tyranny. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 37, at 1566 (arguing that the First Amendment protects
deviant speech “for what it represents in the way of a basic rejection of the moral verities of society”);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982) (theorizing the First
Amendment as protecting “self-realization” and “free will”).
282 See, e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 252-54 (1986);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 896 (1st ed. 1978); Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at
756; J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 563, 611-13 (1977); see also Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073-74 (1981) (reviewing scholarship).
283 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 63, at 142; Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1881, 1919 (1997); Neal Devins, Reflections on Coercing Privacy, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 795, 799 (1999); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination
and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 932 (2006); Michael Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power:
The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 726 (1976).
284 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 273-74 (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31-32 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 125; Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and
Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 396 (1981); Safranek & Safranek, supra note 46, at 247. See generally John
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493 (1997).
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which it is claimed.285 The Court’s frequent recourse to social approval for the
conduct in question—protecting those privileges that are, most commonly, “rooted
in the Nation’s history and traditions”286—attempts to implement both inquiries
while avoiding charges of simply enacting the Justices’ own policy preferences.
Yet the Court’s moralistic turn in its Fourth Amendment analysis is far less
inevitable, and it demands greater skepticism. Far from advancing the Fourth
Amendment’s historic purposes, providing a useful tool in an otherwise vague
constitutional framework, or even greasing its operation on the ground, the
Court’s allocation of Fourth Amendment rights based on moral judgments about
the activities involved is deeply illsuited to the guarantee against unreasonable
searches. That trend runs against our traditional heuristics in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment, including its text, purpose, and practical function as a
shield against oppressive police action. And it runs against any robust reading
of privacy itself, upending prevailing views of that principle as a critical refuge
from, rather than tool of, social scrutiny and expectation. The Court’s consistent
slippages into the jaws of moralistic reasoning, even in an amendment that seems
most suited to a more formalistic and individualist analysis, reveal the very deep
roots of the Court’s communitarian commitments in constitutional analysis.
A. Traditional Interpretive Principles
Most basically, the Court’s moralistic approach to the Katz reasonable
expectations of privacy test conflicts with several traditional tools for
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. It departs from any intuitive reading of
the text. It clashes with the Amendment’s well-documented history and
commonly cited purpose.287 And it obstructs the Fourth Amendment’s
practical operation in regulating police practices, often undercutting its
deterrent effect against police misconduct and preempting its second-stage
inquiry into the reasonableness of acknowledged searches.

285 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing that substantive due process analysis requires the
Court to assesses the relative significance of the valued conduct); see also Cohen, supra note 24, at 79; Safranek
& Safranek, supra note 46, at 241; cf. Aaron J. Rappaport, Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and
the Premises of Privacy, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 441, 450 (noting the need for some “limiting principle”).
286 E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
287 Scholars have of course had their share of disagreements about how best to read the text
and origins of the Fourth Amendment. Compare Donohue, supra note 130, at 1185 (arguing for an
original warrant preference), and Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993) (same), with Amar, supra note 25, at 758 (reading history to require
only the looser standard of reasonableness). As discussed below, the Court’s moralistic approach
departs even from points of relative consensus.
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1. Text
First, and briefly, a model of privacy rights that extends greater
constitutional protections to intimate or otherwise valued social activities is
alien to the text of the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment announces the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures”288—a guarantee agnostic to the
nature of the materials involved, whether business records or diaries.289
Unlike the Due Process Clause’s promise of “liberty” against state
deprivation—a broad term that requires some exegesis, especially when used
to extrapolate unspecified rights from the Constitution—the Fourth
Amendment sets a clear baseline of protections for certain items, including
not only homes but also papers and effects.290 A document or package once
belonging to an individual may become sufficiently attenuated from him to
cease qualifying as his paper or effect—as, for example, in the financial
statements provided by customers to their banks in Miller.291 But there is
nothing in this guarantee that discriminates among enumerated items based
on their intimacy or personal nature,292 or that provides courts guidance on
how such intimacy or personal value may be assessed.293
A theory of Fourth Amendment privacy that discriminates among objects
based on moral value, in short, is simply a bad proxy for the textual guarantees
of that Amendment. Unsurprisingly, the Court’s moralistic approach has led
to some textually counterintuitive results: an individual may expect more
consistent Fourth Amendment protections in the contents of her telephone
conversations than in the contents of her effects.294
2. Purpose and History
Second, the Court’s moralistic emphasis on intimacy sits poorly with the
Fourth Amendment’s documented history and often-cited purpose in
288
289
290

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886) (involving business records).
This is the case even though, as Professors Wasserstrom and Seidman point out, the terms
“search” and “seizure” are “hardly self-defining.” See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 27.
291 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-42 (1976).
292 See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Where in the Fourth
Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed
must be ‘intimate’ in order to be protected by the Constitution?”); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
821-22 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (concluding that distinguishing between
“personal” and “impersonal” items “has no basis in the language or meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
293 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001) (noting the improvidence of
“develop[ing] a jurisprudence specifying which home activities are ‘intimate’ and which are not”).
294 Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), with United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
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prohibiting unreasonable searches. It is a truism of sorts that the central aim of
the Fourth Amendment is to curb government abuses, regulating the terms on
which the state may step into its citizens’ lives.295 The goal of this protection
has typically been theorized as preserving personal and political independence:
protecting individual thought, self-expression, and private life against the state.
Far from simply insulating one’s domestic life from interference, by this view,
the Fourth Amendment protects a far broader realm of personal autonomy.
Historically, as discussed above, the Fourth Amendment’s protections against
unreasonable seizure were not seen as protecting anything so narrow as intimacy
or domesticity.296 They were envisioned as a broad bulwark of individual
sovereignty, safeguarding an individual’s personal property, commercial
freedoms, and political beliefs. At the time of the Amendment’s enactment, its
primary concerns included commercial sites like warehouses and business
fronts—as well as, quite centrally, papers, including business records, as uniquely
precious windows into a man’s secret thoughts.297 Early understandings of the
Fourth Amendment did not aim to protect a right of domesticity or intimate
retreat from the state, and certainly not to encourage orthodox behaviors. They
protected the individual’s right to disagree with political and social orthodoxy.298
Echoing this history, scholars today consistently endorse a view of the
Fourth Amendment as protecting the autonomy of the individual. The
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, by this view, safeguards
not only domestic conduct but a far broader sphere of private life, including
creative experimentation and unorthodox belief.299 From David Sklansky to Jed
295 See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 117, at 1828 (identifying the “great evil toward which [the Fourth
Amendment] is directed” as “abuse of government power”); Huq, supra note 75, at 144 (arguing the Fourth
Amendment constrains the state by precluding prevailing political authorities from “consolidat[ing] state
power absolutely”); Maclin, supra note 287, at 201 (defining the “central meaning of the Fourth Amendment”
as a “distrust of police power and discretion”); Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 119 (describing the Fourth
Amendment’s core function as “navigating the minefield between too much and too little police power”).
296 While some have argued that early search-and-seizure protections excluded actual
contraband, thus in some sense discriminating based on the value of the information revealed, see
Amar, supra note 25, at 767, no one has suggested that they privileged intimacy.
297 See Cloud, supra note 138, at 573-81; Donohue, supra note 130, at 1185, 1219, 1316.
298 See also Dripps, supra note 132, at 61-66 (discussing searches for seditious libel); Huq, supra
note 75, at 146-48 (defining the aim of Fourth Amendment as protecting political dissent); Stuntz, supra
note 132, at 402-03 (noting that early protections against government searches privileged political
dissidents). This is not to deny any historical precedent for weighing the morality of private conduct.
As historians have noted, early critics of general warrants sometimes defended upper-class homes while
remaining largely indifferent to poorer households, especially those associated with lowly conduct like
gambling, hunting, and transience. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1805-06 (2000) (reviewing scholarship on “[t]he elitism of eighteenthcentury search-and-seizure law”). Yet today we recognize that uneven rhetoric as reflecting an insidious
strain of classism—not a desirable principle of governance written into the Fourth Amendment.
299 See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 25, at 295 (“The fourth amendment enacts a vision of the individual
as an autonomous agent, empowered to act and believe and express himself free from government
interference.”); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party
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Rubenfeld to Silas Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman, scholars have argued
that the zone of liberty charted by the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s
right to retreat from the pressures of social convention: to cast off the demands of
civic and public life and to attend to one’s personal desires and fulfillment.300
Whether designated as Rubenfeld’s “right of security”301 or Sklansky’s zone of
“refuge,”302 the procedural limitation against police searches allows the individual
some space where she may exist beyond the specter of public scrutiny.
The Court’s moralistic preference for intimate activities as the Fourth
Amendment’s intended targets departs from this principle of self-sovereignty.
In some cases, indeed, it threatens to entirely upend the Fourth Amendment’s
concern with political independence and dissent—per one suggestion,
protecting individuals from government surveillance for our intimate or
relational activities, but not our professional or political pursuits.303
Rewarding individuals for engaging in conventionally valued acts and social
arrangements, the rise of Fourth Amendment moralism betrays the
Amendment’s organizing concern with political and personal autonomy.
3. Function
Finally, there is the pragmatic question of how the Fourth Amendment
operates in practice, both on the street and in the courtroom. The Court’s
trend of appraising Fourth Amendment protections based on the moral value
of an individual’s conduct poorly serves the internal logic of the guarantee
against “unreasonable” police searches, undercutting any deterrent effect
against police misconduct and precluding the possibility of productive
gradation in the Court’s assessments of police tactics in different circumstances.
First, to the extent that the Court’s moralistic approach ties Fourth
Amendment protections to information discovered only after a police intrusion,
it fails to meaningfully deter improper searches by the state. By harnessing the
ultimate constitutionality of an investigation to information discovered only
after the search, that approach encourages reckless police tactics, rewarding
Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 257-58, 268-69 (2016) (“[A] paramount purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to serve as a guardian of individual liberty and free expression.”); Neil M.
Richards, The Information Privacy Law Policy, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1118-19 (2006); Strandburg, supra note
129, at 659; cf. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1152-53 (2002) (arguing that Fourth Amendment privacy extends past intimacy).
300 Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1113-15; Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 127-31; Wasserstrom & Seidman,
supra note 10, at 110; see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139, 113940 (2014) (articulating Fourth Amendment privacy as “a person’s right to solitude or seclusion”); cf. Michael
Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1111-12 (1996).
301 Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 128.
302 Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1113.
303 See Ferguson, supra note 79, at 1336 (proposing a theory of “personal curtilage” that would
not protect against “[s]urveillance of professional, political, or overtly public activities”).
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agents who take their chances that the information they uncover during a search
will vindicate them after the fact.304 This risk is especially acute considering that
those activities that decrease Fourth Amendment protections—business
meetings rather than social ones, impersonal hobbies rather than intimate
relations—are, not coincidentally, most likely to overlap with criminal conduct
and thus to aid the police. Retroactively immunizing a broad swath of police
activities, even when they implicate entirely law-abiding citizens, the Court’s
moralistic approach undercuts any deterrence against police misconduct.
There is of course a countervailing consideration fueling the Court’s
moralistic analysis. Having established an exclusionary rule against the use of
illicitly obtained evidence, the Court has since tempered the “substantial
social costs” of that penalty through a number of doctrinal wrinkles aimed at
redeeming questionable evidence.305 Distinguishing an individual’s privacy
rights based on the social value of her conduct provides another such wrinkle,
preserving evidence obtained through ambiguous investigatory tactics in at
least some cases likely to overlap with criminal activity. It is no coincidence
that the Court’s moralistic approach has emerged most commonly in its
analyses of novel technologies, like thermal imaging, that both expand the
state’s investigative capacities and raise novel questions about the limits of
police power. Discriminating among more and less deserving categories of
private conduct allows the Court to rein in the police’s use of such intrusive
tactics without entirely depriving them of useful investigative advances.306
Yet the entire rationale behind the exclusionary rule is that this harsh
penalty is critical to protecting Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court has
grudgingly concluded, because less drastic remedies fail to systematically
compel police compliance, the only way to deter violations of the Fourth

304 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that
“Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating
police behavior”); Kerr, supra note 15, at 535 (objecting that tying reasonableness to discovered facts
provides insufficient guidance to police); cf. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2505 (1996) (noting the
Fourth Amendment’s standing requirement “limit[s] the scope of exclusion in ways that seem to run
counter to the deterrence rationale offered for the [exclusionary] rule”).
305 See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1897 (2014)
(reviewing how the Court’s frequent embrace of exceptions has largely undercut the exclusionary rule);
see also Sherry F. Colb, What Is A Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) (noting the “tempt[ation]” for courts to find no Fourth
Amendment violation where the exclusionary rule would “suppress[] reliable, incriminating evidence”).
306 Scholars who adopt the emphasis on intimacy also tend to do so in discussing novel
technologies. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 50-63 (2013) (discussing communications through Facebook);
Ferguson, supra note 79, at 1336 (discussing panvasive video surveillance).
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Amendment is through the exclusion of evidence.307 If we accept the Court’s
reasoning that exclusion is necessary to deter unconstitutional police
action308—or, at the very least, accept that it is now part of our Fourth
Amendment doctrine for that purpose309—we should question the Court’s
attempts to limit the negative externalities of the exclusionary rule through
substantive holdings that undermine not only its own operation, but also any
systemic guidance to police officers about the legality of their investigations.310
Beyond the problem of deterrence, the Court’s moralistic approach raises
a second, more pervasive concern. By placing broad swaths of police tactics
beyond the definition of a “search,” and thus beyond judicial oversight, that
approach prevents judges from drawing more nuanced gradations about which
searches qualify as “reasonable.” The Fourth Amendment, after all, does not
shield individuals against all police searches; it targets only “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”311 The permissibility of any given tactic thus involves
two separate questions: first, whether the police action qualifies as a search,
and second, whether that search is reasonable under the circumstances.312 That
second inquiry often involves a complex balancing of social equities, weighing
“the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy”
against its significance to “the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”313 It is in this second step, measuring an individual’s relative privacy
interests against the value of the investigation, that scholars have traditionally
embraced some normative ranking of the activities likely to be revealed.314
In practice, this second inquiry often means that the outcome of a particular
case will be the same whether or not a court recognizes the police tactic as a
“search.” The same intuitions that lead courts to exclude certain intrusions from
the definition of a search—that such intrusions are minimally invasive, or that they
fail to implicate any truly significant private conduct—also guide courts in setting
307 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961) (dismissing other remedies as “worthless and
futile”); see also William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 780-81
(1989) (discussing the Court’s inevitable reliance on exclusionary remedies).
308 Even critics who theoretically support limiting the Fourth Amendment’s privacy
protections to the innocent concede that the exclusionary rule in criminal cases is necessary to
safeguard that right. See Colb, supra note 9, at 1521; Loewy, supra note 76, at 1264-65.
309 The exclusionary rule has always had its share of critics, who question both its effectiveness
and necessity. See Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
1065, 1065 (1982) (reviewing critiques).
310 Ex ante deterrence is of course less relevant in cases involving binary searches, which search
only for disprivileged information, as well as some digital search technologies.
311 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
312 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1989).
313 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
314 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 77, at 19-20; SLOBOGIN, supra note 77; Selbst, supra note
77, at 685-68. But see Huq, supra note 75, at 109 (“[T]he reasonableness of a search does not depend on its
object or what it happens to discover but rather on the manner in which the government behaves.”).
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the appropriate procedures necessary to render the intrusions “reasonable.” In
many cases, the determination that a police tactic is a “search” leads to a general
warrant requirement.315 But in others, courts can demand significantly lower
thresholds of suspicion, excusing the lack of an actual warrant, requiring
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, or even finding the police’s
techniques per se reasonable based on the broader circumstances at play.316
Deferring any moralistic inquiry until this second step does significant
doctrinal work, allowing courts precision and nuance in how they handle
police tactics. In the case of drug-sniffing dogs, for example, state courts that
extend Fourth Amendment protections commonly impose different standards
of reasonableness in different situations, demanding probable cause for sniffs
targeting homes or persons317 but only “reasonable suspicion” for
automobiles,318 or assuming per se reasonableness for dog sniffs of luggage at
airports.319 Such variation frees the police to use novel technologies where
the public interest is especially high—for example, in locations with high
criminal activity or risk of escape—while preserving stricter protections in
circumstances posing lesser public risk or greater offense to the suspect.
The Court’s moralistic approach obviates this second reasonableness inquiry.
Rather than allowing gradation in the levels of suspicion demanded of the police,
it creates a flat rule carving out certain police tactics from judicial oversight
altogether. It thus deprives the courts of a chance to assess the reasonableness of
even broad categories of police investigations, or to recognize that different
applications might warrant different findings of reasonableness. And it does so
largely to protect police practices that could be salvaged regardless—exacting a
high cost to individual privacy for only a minimal gain for the police.
*

*

*

The Supreme Court’s moralistic definition of a Fourth Amendment
“search” since Katz, in short, finds little support in the core heuristics of the
Fourth Amendment. That approach is hard to square with the Amendment’s
enumeration of protected objects. It belies its original concern with

315 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (noting that the
“reasonableness” of a Fourth Amendment search “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant”).
316 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
317 Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1190-91 (Pa. 2004) (person); State v. Dearman,
962 P.2d 850, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (home).
318 People v. Cox, 739 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710,
716-17 (N.H. 1990); cf. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1987) (imposing a reasonable
suspicion standard for searching a storage facility).
319 See State v. Morrison, 500 N.W.2d 547, 554 (Neb. 1993) (finding a canine sniff at airport
did not constitute a search); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 715-16 (N.H. 1990) (collecting cases).
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intellectual and personal autonomy. And it poorly serves the Fourth
Amendment’s practical operation as a check on unreasonable police tactics.
B. The Value of Privacy
Of course, one may not feel bound by the history or even the text of the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Katz, after all, formally
recentered search-and-seizure doctrine around the notion of “privacy,” a
concept long prized by the Fourth Amendment as “one of the unique values
of our civilization.”320 What might we learn from the concept of privacy itself?
As philosophers, anthropologists, and legal scholars have long
acknowledged, privacy is notoriously difficult to define.321 Over the past
decades, scholars have offered dozens of competing definitions, ranging from
Justice Brandeis’s broad “right to be let alone”322 to Tom Gerety’s more
specific prerogative of “control over the intimacies of personal identity.”323
The ongoing debate has led some to conclude that privacy is simply
irreducible to a single definition.324 It may thus be more illuminating to focus
not on where privacy begins and ends, but rather on what it does: what
function privacy serves in society that entitles it to social and legal solicitude.
With few exceptions, scholars tend to agree that privacy derives its worth
not as an intrinsic value but due to the other values it supports.325 Those
values tend to cluster around five categories: mental wellbeing, intimacy or
interpersonal relationships, autonomy, personhood, and dignity.326

320 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); see also Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (describing privacy protections as “basic to a free society”); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
321 See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977); Hyman
Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 34 (1967); John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor,
Privacy: A Cultural View, in PRIVACY & PERSONALITY 199, 199 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1971); Arthur Schafer, Privacy: A Philosophical Overview, in ASPECTS OF PRIVACY
LAW 1, 4 (Dale Gibson ed., 1980); Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1076-85; Solove, supra note 299, at 1088;
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975).
322 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
323 Gerety, supra note 321, at 236. For a range of additional definitions, see generally ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gross, supra note 321, at 36; Richard
B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
324 See David E. Pozen, Privacy–Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 225-27 (2016);
Solove, supra note 299, at 1090 (arguing that we should stop defining privacy “in terms of necessary
and sufficient” characteristics and proposing a broader taxonomy).
325 See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, Privacy and the Right to Privacy, 55 PHIL. 17, 31 (1980) (“[I]n so far as
there is a right to privacy, it is a derivative right, derived from concern for other values and rights . . . .”).
326 Some have suggested antitotalitarianism as an additional defense, see Rubenfeld, supra note 7,
but this theory largely reduces to the personhood-based approach. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 2, at 1407
(arguing that an antitotalitarian approach cannot “escape eventual collapse into a form of personhood”).
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First, privacy is defended as a buttress for an individual’s mental and
psychological health.327 In a world that perpetually besieges its inhabitants with
demands on their time, behaviors, and beliefs, privacy invites us to “release
[our] emotions [] and . . . relax from the pressure of social role playing.”328 It
alleviates the anxious mind, assuring individuals that certain activities, habits,
or information that they do not wish to share will remain unknown.329 Privacy,
as psychologist Sidney Jourard explains, provides a much-needed opportunity
to “get away, to meditate, to experiment ‘offstage’ . . . , or simply to live daily
life without the pressures . . . [of our] pathogenic life style.” 330
Second, privacy is commonly defended as a precondition for intimate
friendships and other valuable relationships. Initially proposed by Charles
Fried, this view suggests that the condition of privacy facilitates necessary
gradients among our many social relations, allowing us to “reveal parts of
ourselves to friends, family members, and lovers that we withhold from the
rest of the world,” and thus constitutes the very concept of “close” friendships
through the possibility of deeper and shallower acquaintances.331 And even
beyond the case of intimate relationships, privacy allows us to maintain a full
spectrum of social relations, compartmentalizing our differing personas in
different settings and thus balancing the diverse spheres of our daily lives.332
Third, privacy is prized as the bedrock of individual autonomy, the key to
an individual’s emergence as a “unique and self-determining being.”333 By
separating the individual from society—that perpetual system of public
instructions, duties, and rewards—privacy encourages the individual to become
both an independent actor and an independent moral thinker: one who acts not
based on the threat of disapproval, but in accordance with his own personal

327 See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738-39 (1999); Gavison,
supra note 323, at 448-49; Melody Torbati, The Right of Intimate Sexual Relations: Normative and Social
Bases for According It “Fundamental Right” Status, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1822-23 (1997).
328 Schafer, supra note 321, at 15.
329 WESTIN, supra note 323, at 33-34.
330 Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307,
316 (1966).
331 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 11 (2000) (describing privacy as “necessary for the
formation of intimate relationships”); see also Judith Wagner DeCew, Privacy, in THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 584, 585 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (arguing that privacy
“gives one the ability to determine one’s distance from others”); Fried, supra note 323, at 483-86.
332 James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 323, 326-31 (1975) (defining
privacy as central to “our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with
different people”); see also Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in
PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 148 (Richard Bronoaugh ed., 1978).
333 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 971 (1964); see also BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 17-18 (R. D. V. Glasgow
trans., 2005); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 34 (1976).
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values.334 Privacy, in the words of Jeffrey Reiman, is the “social ritual by means
of which an individual’s moral title to his existence is conferred.”335 Only
through that experience does the individual come into his own as an
“autonomous and self-defining, rather than [a] socially imbedded” being.336
Fourth, and by far most common in the American tradition, privacy is
valued as a precondition of personhood: the development of one’s unique
opinions, interests, preferences, and beliefs.337 Privacy as personhood finds
one of its seminal proponents in John Stuart Mill, who urged that human
beings reach perfection “not by wearing down into uniformity all that is
individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth.”338 Privacy
provides a necessary space for such self-realization, inviting us to experiment
with unorthodox ideas, tastes, and beliefs without fear of ridicule or
judgment.339 “Without privacy,” psychologist Leontine Young has written,
“there is no individuality,” for who “know[s] what he thinks and feels if he
never has the opportunity to be alone with his thoughts and feelings.”340 More
than allowing the individual to realize that he exists beyond society, privacy
allows him to define who he is: to unearth unique identity and personality.
Finally, privacy has been defended as a safeguard of human dignity. By
this view, privacy derives its value by allowing individuals “to control [their]
public image,” shielding the public from displays of weakness, eccentricity, or
vulnerability that would embarrass us or otherwise corrode our social
standing.341 It also fosters productive social interactions, hiding information
334 RICHARDS, supra note 282, at 243-44; Gavison, supra note 323, at 449-50 (arguing that
“[a]utonomy requires the capacity to make an independent moral judgment”).
335 Reiman, supra note 333, at 39 (emphasis removed).
336 Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2095 (2001).
337 See Cohen, supra note 24, at 78; Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 753. Personhood and autonomy
are interrelated, and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably by scholars. I define autonomy
as the recognition of one’s moral worth as an independent decisionmaker and personhood as the
development of an individual’s unique personality. I group scholars according to the substance of
their definition, rather than their terminology.
338 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 109 (Edward Alexander ed., Broadview Literary Texts
1999) (1859).
339 See ROSEN, supra note 331, at 217 (“[I]ndividuals need refuge not merely from their families
and colleagues but also from the overwhelming pressures toward social conformity.”); WESTIN, supra
note 323, at 34 (describing privacy as “vital to the development of individuality and consciousness of
individual choice in life”); see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 75 (2009); Bloustein,
supra note 333, at 1003; C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 23-24
(1983); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFS. 269, 276 (1983). But see
Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1097 (noting a lack of conclusive evidence that surveillance breeds conformity).
340 LEONTINE YOUNG, LIFE AMONG THE GIANTS 130 (1966).
341 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151,
1161-62 (2004) (describing privacy as “a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity”); see
also FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 17 (1992) (“[P]rivacy norms
express respect for human dignity by protecting us from public association with the beastly, the unclean.”);
TRIBE, supra note 282, at 888 (arguing that privacy allows one “to be master of the identity one creates in
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that would harm our reputation or has no legitimate bearing on our public
identity.342 The dignitary theory is more widely embraced in Europe than in
the United States, but it has some intuitive applications here as well.343 One
may speak, for example, of seeking “privacy” to change one’s clothes, or of
granting “privacy” to a bereaved family in its time of grief.344
These discrete value-functions of privacy are deeply socially embedded. From
intimacy to autonomy to personhood, defenses of privacy come down to particular
views of human flourishing: value-laden theories about how individuals should act
or find fulfillment.345 Accordingly, privacy has sometimes been defended precisely
as a tool of social norms, situating individuals in a network of prescribed
identities.346 The dignitary view, for example, envisions the individual as defined
by her role in the public order; privacy allows her to fulfill extrinsic expectations.347
Similarly, privacy as a precondition for personal relationships bolsters the
individual’s ability to embody social expectation, authentically performing a
variety of social roles.348 Even privacy as the bedrock of intimate relationships
may be valued to the extent that it buttresses pre-approved arrangements:
relationships of love, trust, and friendship that society deems uniquely valuable.
Consistent with this approach, philosopher Michael Sandel has lauded substantive
due process cases like Lawrence for demarcating privacy rights around the social
merits of the intimacy conduct at issue.349
The prevailing view, however, tends to resist valorizing privacy as a servant
of social convention. As Silas Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman object,
viewing privacy as a facilitator of public norms “seriously distort[s] the meaning
the world”); WESTIN, supra note 323, at 36; Post, supra note 334, at 2092 (noting that an “invasion of privacy
can constitute an intrinsic offense against dignity”). Although Edward Bloustein is commonly associated
with a dignity-based view due to his article, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 333, his
argument falls closer to the personhood-based defense. See supra text accompanying note 333.
342 See Rachels, supra note 332, at 331.
343 See Whitman, supra note 341, at 1160-63.
344 The dignitary defense also abuts on the zones of experimentation and relaxation discussed
above, which allow individuals to hide private thoughts that do not fit their public image.
345 See Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 82 (1987)
(noting that autonomy, as a goal animating privacy protections, depends on specific “social practices”
and may not be a value shared by all societies); Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 761 (noting that the
personhood defense assumes “individualist understanding of human self-definition”); Schafer, supra
note 321, at 13 (noting that “the specific content of [privacy] norms found in various societies differs
widely”); W.L. Weinstein, The Private and the Free, in PRIVACY & PERSONALITY, supra note 321, at
27, 28 (stating that “spheres of the private exist . . . as parts of the community’s ways of thought”).
346 See SCHOEMAN, supra note 341, at 15 (conceptualizing privacy as protecting either selfexpression or “behavior carried on in private [that] is rigidly defined by social norms”).
347 See Post, supra note 336, at 2092-93 (noting that the dignitarian theory “presupposes persons
who are socially embedded, whose identity and self-worth depend upon the performance of social
norms”); see also Whitman, supra note 341, at 1161-62.
348 See SCHOEMAN, supra note 341, at 7 (arguing that privacy does not shield individuals from
but rather compartmentalizes social pressures); Rachels, supra note 332, at 327-28, 331.
349 SANDEL, supra note 63, at 93-94.
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most of us attach to privacy,” not as a stepping stone toward but as a “refuge
from the obligations of citizenship.”350 Privacy as a thing of value, by this
account, does not facilitate an individual’s performance of the roles demanded
of him by society. To the contrary, it entails an escape from such normative social
expectations: a sanctuary from the scrutiny and pressures of the public sphere.351
This morally neutral view is implicit, in some measure, in each of the five
defenses. Privacy as a bridge toward personhood, for example, posits that the
individual discovers her own preferences and beliefs by cultivating some
sanctuary beyond the pull of social expectation. Privacy shields her “every need,
thought, desire, fancy or gratification . . . [from] public scrutiny,”352 and thus
allows her to “define [herself] in contradistinction to the values of the society in
which [she] happen[s] to live.”353 Similarly, privacy as the bedrock of autonomy
affirms the individual’s control over his own conduct and moral judgments,354
constituting the individual as an independent moral actor outside the “coercive
force” of his society—the type of self-direction that is the “very essence of
morality.”355 Privacy as a precondition to mental wellbeing provides a respite
from pressures of society: a temporary “relief” from “the variety of roles that
life demands” of the individual.356 The defense of privacy based on intimacy,
while in one sense facilitating privileged relationships, also depends on the
individual’s ability to distance herself from social expectation, relaxing in front
of trusted acquaintances without fear of judgment.357 Even the dignitary view
350 Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 110; see also Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 754 (1999) (“[P]rivacy means more than that others should let me alone
to be the best darn African-American, Methodist, suburban wife and mother I can be. Privacy is
also a matter of freedom to escape, reject, and modify such identities.”).
351 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 46, at 1302 (“[P]rivacy is nothing less than society’s limiting principle.”);
Weinstein, supra note 345, at 54 (describing privacy as “opting out of society”); Clinton Rossiter, The Pattern
of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 15, 17 (Milton R. Konvitz & Clinton Rossiter eds., 1958) (characterizing
privacy “as an attempt to secure autonomy . . . in defiance of all the pressures of modern society”); cf.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 96-102 (1987) (“Conceptually, the private is
hermetic. It means that which is inaccessible to, unaccountable to, unconstructed by anything beyond itself.”).
352 Bloustein, supra note 333, at 1003.
353 Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 761; see also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 210 (1999)
(noting that privacy allows men “to individuate without activating legal . . . or moral (communal)
pressure—a respite from the social”); NISSENBAUM, supra note 339, at 75 (noting that privacy allows
individuals to act without fear of “tangible and intangible reprisals, such as ridicule, loss of a job, or denial
of benefits”); Arnold Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY, supra note 321, at 71, 82-83
(defining privacy as “territory that gets to be ‘our own’ in an uneasy truce between our selves and society”).
354 Post, supra note 334, at 2095 (recognizing privacy as respecting individuals as autonomous
beings free from social input and scrutiny); see also Fried, supra note 24, at 288.
355 J. Roland Pennock, Introduction, in PRIVACY & PERSONALITY, supra note 321, at xi, xii-xiii.
356 WESTIN, supra note 323, at 35; see also Jourard, supra note 330, at 308 (valuing privacy as a
reprieve from an individual’s obligations within “various social systems”).
357 If privacy provides a fertile ground for intimate relationships, it is not through the intrinsic
intimacy of seclusion but through the unique levels of trust that develop away from outside scrutiny.
See supra notes 331–332 and accompanying text.
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assumes that the individual should get some measure of reprieve from social
norms: that she simply cannot always fulfill society’s demands of her, and
therefore should be able to indulge in weaknesses and foibles without scrutiny.358
The very project of valorizing a “right” to privacy, in short, assumes a
highly liberal political theory.359 Inherent in the conventional defenses of
privacy as a value worth protecting is the significance of the individual’s right
to exit society, to take refuge in a space free from the scrutiny, pressures, and
expectations of the world. Privacy is a zone where the individual exists and
acts without the weight of scrutiny and judgment. It is a socially recognized
space where individuals may exist outside social recognition.
And if, in a core sense, privacy is a retreat from social scrutiny, then it is
intrinsically incompatible with a precondition of social approval for the actions
for which privacy is sought.360 Because the value of privacy derives from
shielding the individual from the operations of public judgment—providing
some zone to engage in even socially disdained activities—privacy must, if it
means anything, encompass both activities that the community encourages and
those that it rejects. Prized as an escape from the pressures of social expectations,
privacy as a concept most of us would recognize stands at odds with an individual
“right of privacy” tied to the normative value of the conduct it protects.
*

*

*

It is thus fairly difficult to find support for the moralistic strain that has
pervaded the Court’s assessments of “reasonable” privacy expectations since
Katz. That moralistic approach is a poor proxy for the Fourth Amendment’s
text, conflicts with that Amendment’s historic emphasis on personal and
intellectual autonomy, and hinders its practical operation in regulating
overbearing police action. Not least, that approach conflicts with any robust
view of “privacy” itself, contravening the core value of privacy as a refuge
from social judgment. Unlike the Court’s normative analysis of due process
privacy, an arguably inevitable trend that sustains the Due Process Clause’s
operation as a source of substantive rights, the Court’s moralistic turn seems
particularly illsuited to its Fourth Amendment analysis.

358 See Whitman, supra note 341, at 1161-62 (exploring privacy as a right to avoid public
revelation of conduct that endangers “our public dignity”).
359 See also RÖESSLER, supra note 333, at 10 (identifying respect for privacy as constitutive of
a liberal order); Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 761 (concluding that personhood theory assumes an
“individualist understanding of human self-definition”).
360 See Hickey, supra note 69, at 1006 (decrying a right of privacy that exists “only under the approving
gaze of the judge” as “paradoxical,” as it “requires observation and judgment of exactly what you want to
hide from view”); cf. Colb, supra note 7, at 1646 (arguing that the right to privacy prevents the state not only
“from incarcerating people for the exercise of their rights,” but also “from observing their exercise”).
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V. BEYOND FOURTH AMENDMENT MORALISM
The rise of Fourth Amendment moralism challenges the familiar view of
the Fourth Amendment as a purely procedural limitation on police conduct.
More than simply regulating overbearing state action, the Fourth Amendment
in the past decades has lent itself to a highly substantive approach to individual
rights, recognizing and rewarding privileged categories of private conduct.
Rubbing against the text, structure, and history of that provision, as well as
against any robust view of “privacy” itself, this moralistic strain has
consistently eroded the individual’s protections against unreasonable searches.
The Court’s moralistic approach is especially salient to a growing issue in
Fourth Amendment doctrine: the digital search. As both our growing reliance
on electronic communications and the advancing sophistication of digital
search algorithms expand the scope and precision of police investigations, the
Court’s moralistic definition of a “search” threatens to throw a broad swath of
personal data beyond Fourth Amendment oversight. The heightened risks
posed by Fourth Amendment moralism in the digital age call for two immediate
amendments to the reasonable expectations of privacy doctrine. First, the
Court must renounce its emphasis on “intimacy,” restoring a broader view of
Fourth Amendment values as encompassing more individualistic and
unorthodox private pursuits. Second, the Court must abandon the binary-search
doctrine derived from cases like Jacobsen and Caballes, especially in light of the
breadth of personal information that such searches can reveal in the digital age.
Ultimately, however, recognizing the persistent moralism of the Katz
framework might be less salient to the project of rehabilitating Fourth
Amendment privacy than of moving past it altogether. Over past decades,
numerous critics have decried the conceptual and pragmatic limitations of
“privacy” as a touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis. Especially given
the shifting cultural and technological norms surrounding private data, many
urge replacing privacy with a doctrinal framework better suited to upholding
individual autonomy, self-definition, and expressive freedom in the digital
age. The Court’s deeply moralistic assessment of Fourth Amendment rights
supports this reformist project, demonstrating the extent to which Katz’s
privacy-based framework has failed on its own terms. Yet by that same token,
it also challenges the extent to which Katz’s limitations can be traced to
privacy itself—and in that, the viability of the alternatives proposed by critics.
Demonstrating the Court’s resistance to vindicating liberal values of retreat
and self-determination even in a Fourth Amendment framework deeply
sympathetic to those principles, the Court’s moralistic analysis suggests both the
importance and the profound difficulty of reviving a liberal Fourth Amendment.
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A. Revisiting Fourth Amendment Doctrine
The moralistic strain that has invaded the reasonable expectation of
privacy inquiry calls for an urgent reassessment of several developments in
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since Katz. These
developments include, most notably, the Court’s emphasis on intimacy as that
value that the Fourth Amendment is “intended to shelter,” as well as the
Court’s demarcation of certain investigative tactics as purely binary searches
revealing no legitimate facts about a defendant’s private life.
These moralistic precedents are longstanding, having spent decades among the
Court’s Fourth Amendment caselaw without, one may argue, any catastrophic
effects. Yet they demand particular attention today, in light of the shifting terrain
of both digital communications and digital search technologies. The lives of
Americans are lived increasingly on the web. We use email, text messaging, and
social networking sites to make social plans, discuss politics and hobbies, and share
personal details with intimates. We shop for major purchases and daily
conveniences, read articles and books, and stream audio and visual entertainment.
We meet romantic partners, forge friendships based on recreational interests, and
play games with strangers. We have anonymous discussions about health, politics,
religion, sex, and any number of controversial or embarrassing topics.
The third-party doctrine inherited from cases like Miller and Smith,
suggesting that data shared with corporate entities cannot raise a reasonable
expectation of privacy, has traditionally been seen to put digital
communications beyond the Fourth Amendment.361 Yet in recent years, the
third-party doctrine has shown signs of erosion. At least one circuit court has
held that individuals harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content
of their emails.362 The Supreme Court, too, has demonstrated a growing
sensitivity to the significance of personal information stored by cellphone
companies and cloud storage providers.363
361 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (presuming,
and critiquing, the applicability of the third-party doctrine to electronic communications in the
digital age); see also Bambauer, supra note 163, at 212-14; Harris, supra note 163, at 898; Orin S. Kerr,
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 573 (2009); Solove, supra note 299, at
1085. But see Strandburg, supra note 129, at 622 (questioning the strength of third-party doctrine in
the Court’s recent jurisprudence). Instead, digital searches are regulated primarily by a set of federal
statutes, which allow the police to obtain the content of many digital communications on far less
than a warrant. For an overview, see generally Gabriel R. Schlabach, Note, Privacy in the Cloud: The
Mosaic Theory and the Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677 (2015).
362 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86 (6th Cir. 2010).
363 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.
746, 759-60 (2010). The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017), addressing whether individuals may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone
location data, confirms the Court’s ongoing interest in this topic, although any decision in Carpenter is
unlikely to resolve the many implications raised by Fourth Amendment moralism in the digital sphere.
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The prospect of extending Fourth Amendment protections to electronic
communications has been welcomed by many commentators, promising to align
Fourth Amendment doctrine with a modern world that requires some threshold
of data-sharing as the price of entry into public life.364 Yet the novel possibilities
of electronic data storage—and specifically of electronic searches—also promise
to accelerate the Fourth Amendment’s moralistic turn since Katz. The
sophisticated, aggregative capacity of digital search software dramatically
improves the state’s ability to limit its investigations to preselected categories of
information, blurring the line between searches likely to reveal privileged activities
and those that do so in retrospect. And such technology expands the scope of the
ostensibly sui generis binary-search doctrine,365 handing the police a range of new
investigative tools that reveal only—supposedly—the overt traces of crime.
The corrosive effects of Fourth Amendment moralism, especially in the
digital age, call for at least two amendments to the Court’s reasonable
expectations of privacy doctrine.
1. Looking Past Intimacy
First, the Court must redress its recent and often deeply exclusionary
emphasis on intimacy as the core target of Fourth Amendment protections.
Most basically, this move would require the Court to revisit those doctrines
that invite judges to retrospectively analyze a defendant’s conduct in a given case:
the aerial surveillance cases, which urge stricter protections for “intimate” conduct
than lowlier activities on one’s curtilage, and Carter, which ties a guest’s Fourth
Amendment protections to the social nature of her visit.366 These doctrines entail
a fundamentally communitarian assessment of a defendant’s private conduct,
presuming that certain relationships or personal activities are simply worthier of
procedural protections than others. And they have inspired the lower courts to
restrict Fourth Amendment protections in often troubling ways. Prior to Kyllo,
after all, lower courts applied curtilage cases like Dow and Riley to authorize
thermal surveillance of the home, an intrusion later denounced by the Court
itself.367 Even since Kyllo, lower courts have continued to privilege “intimate” over
364 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375,
1436 (2004); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1592 (2004); Price, supra note 299, at
249. For comprehensive critiques, see also Bombauer, supra note 163, at 212-15, Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle
Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 992-996 (2016), Erin Murphy,
The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1239 (2009), and Andrew E.
Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint?, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839, 849-50 (2013). But see Kerr,
supra note 361, at 564-65 (defending the third-party doctrine as providing predictability and clarity).
365 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
366 See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
367 See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
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lesser details in non-home settings,368 or to deny Fourth Amendment protections
for new police tools that reveal no “intimate” details.369 In far stronger terms than
it did in Kyllo, the Court must reject such moralistic discrimination, correcting its
suggestion that a police “search” may depend on the intimacy of the data revealed.
More broadly, the Court should reconsider even those Fourth Amendment
doctrines that prospectively value intimate spaces over sites housing more
individualistic or unorthodox activities. The definition of curtilage espoused in
Dunn, for example, attaches stronger Fourth Amendment protections to domestic
or intimate uses of one’s personal property than to more recreational or commercial
pursuits.370 Dunn involved a barn apparently used for chemical or scientific
experimentation; that same analysis would seem to extend directly to, say, welding,
wood cutting, or gardening.371 Nothing in the Fourth Amendment’s text, purpose,
or history suggests such a selective view of valued conduct. Particularly within
traditionally protected spaces, the Court must adopt a richer view of individual
fulfillment, recognizing an individual’s entitlement to privacy whether he chooses
to use the property for marital embraces or less common recreational activities.
It is especially important to renounce such moralistic reasoning in the
digital sphere. For despite some scholars’ eagerness to bury the third-party
doctrine wholesale,372 courts are unlikely to extend full-fledged Fourth
Amendment protections to all digital communications, opting instead for
some limiting principle that would preserve the police’s ability to use
especially useful investigative technologies.373 Scholars have proposed
numerous such principles, from the voluntariness of a given disclosure374 to
the exclusivity of an online forum375 to the individualized nature of the
368 E.g., United States v. Parrilla, No. 13-360, 2014 WL 2111680, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014)
(allowing canine sniffs in “nonresidential commercial places”).
369 E.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217 (5th Cir. 2001) (audio surveillance); People
v. Stanley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 1999) (surveillance of electricity meter).
370 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1987).
371 Id.; cf. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (distinguishing the cultivation of plants in
a greenhouse from more “intimate” domestic activities); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179
(1984) (discounting the “cultivation of crops”).
372 See sources cited supra note 364.
373 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 77, at 66 (predicting courts would not extend the warrant
requirement to all third-party records since doing so would “unduly cripple law enforcement”);
Solove, supra note 299, at 1089; see also Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media,
31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 238 (2012) (defending more selective protections).
374 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 364, at 1253 (suggesting a “heightened standard for what
constitutes ‘voluntary’ disclosure of information held by third parties”); Christopher Slobogin,
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 331 (2008) (proposing
protections for “inadvertent[]” disclosures).
375 See, e.g., Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine of
the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 67-68 (2011) (urging a distinction between data
shared through more selective online channels and that posted to public forums); Henderson, supra note
373, at 238-40, 247; Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 361, at 1003-04; Strandburg, supra note 129, at 675.
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data.376 Some even suggest tying protections to the nature of the intercepted
information—defining that swath of protection broadly, as encompassing not
just intimacy but also individualistic values of self-expression, intellectual
experimentation, and recreation.377 Numerous justices on the Court have,
indeed, revealed themselves sympathetic to this broad view.378
Yet the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent since Katz suggests a
narrower approach: privileging electronic communications that touch on
conventionally valued activities, most notably intimacy and interpersonal
relationships. Cases like Riley, Carter, and Dunn would support extending
constitutional protections to personal emails but not professional or
commercial exchanges379; messages that advance social or romantic bonds but
not more recreational pursuits380; communications within ongoing
relationships but not more recent or short-lived acquaintances.381
As in the analog world, these distinctions would deny judicial
protections to online spaces generally associated with less privileged
communications—recognizing Fourth Amendment “searches” of dating sites, for
example, but not gaming sites or fan boards. Yet the sophistication of digital
technology means that the courts need not rely on such prospective or categorical
rules, but may also look directly to the content of communications sought in any
given case. Technologies in use today for analyzing and aggregating digital data
could ascertain with significant accuracy the nature of any specific communication
sought by the police: whether the parties to an exchange are family members or
recent acquaintances; whether an email falls within a commercial or purely social
transaction; whether a given conversation pertains to one’s family, recreational
interests, romantic plans, or professional partnerships.382 Such technology blurs
376 See Slobogin, supra note 374, at 331, 337; Solove, supra note 299, at 1156 (suggesting that protections
for data attached directly to the individual, rather than to broader aggregates or social groups).
377 See Price, supra note 299, at 249 (arguing that “papers” should encompass “expressive and
associational data, regardless of its form, how it is created, or where it is located”); Richards, supra
note 299, at 1118-19 (proposing that privacy protection ought to encompass any records of an
individual’s “private intellectual exploration”); Solove, supra note 299, at 1152-53; Strandburg, supra
note 129, at 659-63. Echoing this broader view, the American Bar Association has urged solicitude
for exchanges that implicate not only intimacy or socially valued acts, but also “freedom of speech”
and data “likely to cause embarrassment or stigma.” ABA STANDARDS, supra note 77, at 19-20.
378 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (noting the privacy implications of searching
a cellphone, by which “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed”); City of Ontario v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification.”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
379 Cf. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
380 Cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987).
381 Cf. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
382 Any of these searches could be run by technology like Palantir, an algorithm currently used, among
other things, to detect cyberfraud and terrorist cells operating on the Internet. See Palantir Gotham,
PALANTIR (2018), http://www.palantir.com/palantir-gotham/ [https://perma.cc/F4TX-VZDW]. For
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the difference between protecting certain spaces because they are associated with
more valuable activities (and thus, as in Katz, preserving some Fourth Amendment
rights regardless of actual conduct) and protecting individuals who in fact engage in
more valuable activities (thus, as in Carter, tying Fourth Amendment rights directly
to the implicated conduct). If, in the analog world, the direct impact of cases like
Carter is limited by the reality that the police cannot know ahead of time what they
will uncover,383 the digital search eliminates that residual deterrent effect, freeing
the police to collect vast amount of data with confidence that their actions lie
outside constitutional scrutiny. The unprecedented capacity of electronic searches
to collect and parse personal data makes it all the more important for the Court to
peel back its narrow emphasis on intimacy as the heart of the Fourth Amendment,
restoring a richer view of Fourth Amendment values as guarding not only
meaningful relationships but also intellectual, creative, and recreational autonomy.
Foreswearing such moralistic distinctions, of course, will not necessarily lead
to greater Fourth Amendment protections for defendants. To the extent that the
Court’s current approach is problematically discriminatory—privileging certain
private activities and pursuits over others—the Court could as easily resolve that
inequity by leveling down as leveling up: stripping social guests of their standing
in a third-party’s home, or exposing broad categories of personal data to digital
search. Nevertheless, forcing the Court to grapple with the broader panoply of
activities implicated by a given tactic will lead to more equal rules defining
Fourth Amendment searches: ones that distribute both the benefits and costs of
the Court’s linedrawing more uniformly upon all defendants. And in practice,
the Court’s repeated reliance on moralism to scale back Fourth Amendment
rights in previously protected zones, as well as its frequent asides exempting
intimate conduct from otherwise restrictive rules, suggests that a broader lens
will lead to more expansive constitutional protections.
2. Recognizing Binary Searches
Second, in light of its fundamentally moralistic foundation, the Court and
lower court judges must cabin, if not renounce, the binary-search doctrine:
the principle that investigative techniques revealing only the presence or
absence of contraband fail to qualify as “searches.”384 Criticized by scholars
on multiple grounds, from the Fourth Amendment’s general antipathy to
further discussion of the software’s capabilities, see generally Quentin Hardy, Unlocking Secrets, If Not Its Own
Value, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/business/unlocking-secrets-if-notits-own-value.html [https://perma.cc/4JB6-WMMD], and Shane Harris, Killer App, WASHINGTONIAN
(Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.washingtonian.com/2012/01/31/killer-app/ [https://perma.cc/X4QF-T52J].
383 This deterrent effect is arguably minimal, considering the paucity of civil remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations. See Stuntz, supra note 307, at 780 (noting that damages are only
available for Fourth Amendment violations in cases of “fairly egregious police error”).
384 See discussion supra Section III.C.
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retrospective analysis to the antidemocratic nature of an omniscient state,385
that doctrine is defended largely based on the limited information it reveals—
only, its proponents insist, the fact of criminality.386
The binary-search doctrine first arose surrounding the practice of
drug-sniffing dogs,387 and has since largely remained limited to the domain
of drug testing: chemical drug tests,388 or bloodwork in labs.389 As such, it
might be easily dismissed as something of an exception to the Fourth
Amendment, a marginal wrinkle resolving a limited category of cases.
Yet the electronic search stands to dramatically expand the doctrine’s scope.
By analyzing, aggregating, and comparing datasets ranging from personal
emails to public records, digital technology gives the police a newfound
capacity to pinpoint only those documents or transactions that disclose some
illicit activity. Common examples in use today include “hash” programs that
search private computers for known images of child pornography, or programs
that scan user data for pirated media or hacked software.390 But there is also a
growing body of smart technology, which does not search for specific files but
decodes and interprets the content of unknown documents: image recognition
software that identifies subjects depicted in photographs,391 or software that
reads and aggregates data to conclude whether a particular message was sent in
furtherance of a criminal scheme, from wire fraud to terrorism.392 The
increasing volume of personal interaction occurring on digital platforms,
385 E.g., Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 353 (2010) (warning of the risk of “a surveillance state
coming into being through the contraband exception”); Melilli, supra note 272, at 366-67. Binary
searches have also been critiqued for intruding on the individual’s zone of refuge, see Sacharoff, supra
note 300, at 1139-40; Adler, supra note 300, at 1111, neglecting the individual’s privacy expectations
in a given location rather than object, see Harris, supra note 272, at 40-41, and categorically removing
policing tactics from judicial oversight. See id. at 39.
386 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
387 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (characterizing the practice of dog-sniff
searches as “sui generis”).
388 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984).
389 State v. Price, 270 P.3d 527, 531 (Utah 2012).
390 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 32122 (2015) (describing potential future implications); Sacharoff, supra note 300, at 1182-84 (describing
the software and its use). These are currently used largely by private entities. Kerr, supra, at 321-22;
cf. Ben Gilbert, Windows 10 Automatically Scans your Computer for Pirated Software, But That’s a Good
Thing, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-windows-10scans-for-pirated-games-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/3QNF-AHEY].
391 See Christian Szegedy, Building a Deeper Understanding of Images, GOOGLE RES. BLOG
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://research.googleblog.com/2014/09/building-deeper-understanding-of-images
[https://perma.cc/YX6G-G8EX]; Ken Weiner, Why Image Recognition is About to Transform Business,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/30/why-image-recognition-isabout-to-transform-business/ [https://perma.cc/Z2GP-47RF].
392 See supra note 382 and accompanying text. To the extent that such technology reveals not
physical contraband but rather evidence of a crime, that is of course all “contraband” is to begin with.
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coupled with our advancing technologies for searching those communications,
pushes many more police investigations into the realm of the “binary search.”
Such technology might not rankle our intuitions when used to capture child
pornography or to uncover terrorist cells.393 But it is easy to imagine any number
of harder cases: images of individuals using drugs, or text discussions related to
drug purchases; exchanges revealing a sexual relationship with a minor,
including consensual sexting among teenagers in many jurisdictions; references
to bigamous or polygamous marriages, or the purchase of outlawed sexual
devices; emails discussing the status or employment of undocumented
immigrants. These searches, too, may be run to alert investigators to nothing but
the presence of criminal evidence in a given document. Yet in such cases, it seems
far more intuitive that these searches do not reveal only the fact of criminality,
but also delve into far broader features of our social, intellectual, and personal
lives, from romantic entanglements to sexual preferences to family origins.394
A firm application of the binary-search doctrine would exclude all such
investigative activities from the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The
precedent established by Caballes and Jacobsen—cases grounded on the Court’s
specific view that the possession of narcotics reveals no legitimate facts about the
defendants395—would thus create a carte blanche for the police to run any number
of searches that implicate substantial details about our personal and private lives.
Alternately, the digital sphere may invite courts to temper the binary-search
doctrine through the example of the Court’s more overtly moralistic cases like
Riley and Carter. Privileging interpersonal and intimate activities even in
circumstances where lowlier conduct gets no protection, such cases would urge
judges to distinguish among more or less offensive binary searches—approving
investigations of fraud or drug dealing, for example, while holding that searches
revealing consensual sexting among teenagers or the purchase of sexual devices
intrude on a protected realm of interpersonal intimacy. In this case, there would
be little doubt that the limits of a Fourth Amendment search are defined not
by the legality of a defendant’s conduct, but by its relative social significance.
Regardless of which approach courts choose, the possibilities of digital
technology greatly expand the corrosive effects of the binary-search doctrine,
revealing the extent to which even “binary” searches step on any number of
393 For defenses of such uses, see Sacharoff, supra note 300, at 1182, Simmons, supra note 79, at
1352, and also United States v. Stevenson, No. 3:12-cr-00005, 2012 WL 12895560 (S.D. Iowa June 20,
2012, which questions if hash programs identifying child pornography are searches, and Ashlee Vance
& Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 22,
2011, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-22/palantir-the-war-on-terrorssecret-weapon [https://perma.cc/NlW5-58AQ], which details software used to uncover terrorist cells.
394 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (acknowledging that information
regarding recreational interests, addictions, health, and romance infringes on one’s personal life).
395 See supra notes 246–66 and accompanying text.
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legitimate aspects of one’s life. In light of both the moralistic nature of the
binary-search doctrine and the broad swath of data revealed by such searches
in the digital age, the Court must curtail the doctrine, recognizing that police
tactics designed to pinpoint only traces of a crime may nevertheless qualify
as “searches.” Bringing ostensibly binary searches within the ambit of the
Fourth Amendment will allow the courts to exercise some oversight over a
broad and powerful new tool of police investigation.
And, crucially, it will not deny police officers the use of any especially
valuable search functions. Since even acknowledged searches remain subject
to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry, many new technologies,
such as hash searches for child pornography or drug-sniffing dogs at airports,
can still be deemed categorically valid under that second prong. Discarding
the binary-search doctrine will simply restore some threshold of judicial
review to a growing sphere of police investigation, protecting the individual’s
privacy expectations in less urgent, more sensitive cases.396
B. Revisiting Fourth Amendment Privacy
Beyond these doctrinal remedies, the Court’s moralistic approach to
assessing reasonable expectations of privacy under Katz adds a new wrinkle
to a broader debate: the search for an alternative to “privacy” as the
organizing principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The moralism that
has invaded the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis since Katz reveals the
Court’s deep-seated resistance to vindicating liberal values of individual
autonomy and unorthodoxy, even in a procedural amendment ostensibly
blind to a defendant’s private conduct, and in a conceptual framework
fundamentally opposed to communitarian judgment. As scholars question the
viability of Fourth Amendment “privacy” in the digital age, the rise of Fourth
Amendment moralism demonstrates both the importance and the profound
396 The rise of Fourth Amendment moralism may also weigh in favor of the Court’s recent revival of
the trespass test as a type of Fourth Amendment floor for police tactics that entail some form of physical entry.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012). Scholars have debated the merits of that development,
decrying the trespass test for perpetuating outdated theories of property, see Erin Murphy, Back to the Future:
The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 327 (2012), arguing that a split analysis
exacerbates the Court’s already muddled definition of a search, see Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1072-73, Murphy,
supra, at 327-28, and disputing whether the trespass test makes a difference in the courts’ analysis, see Orin S.
Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 94. The moralism that has
invaded the Court’s Katz analysis suggests that the trespass test indeed makes a difference, providing a morally
neutral backstop to that standard—and that it may frequently expand a defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation using
the trespass approach despite the lack of privacy interests in marijuana); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
37-38 (2001) (relying on a property-based analysis to reverse the lower courts’ intimacy-based defense of
thermal imaging); United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (speculating
that Jacobsen would have turned out differently under a trespass-based analysis).
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difficulty of restoring a Fourth Amendment doctrine capable of protecting
liberal individualism.
The Court’s reliance on privacy as the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment has drawn its share of controversy. From the beginning, there
has been Justice Black’s textualist objection that “privacy” finds no mention
in the Fourth Amendment—an objection echoed by prominent critics
since.397 And there is the persistent idea that the test is circular, allowing the
reality of police practices to define their legality, though that criticism is fairly
directly addressed by the Court’s own caselaw.398
Beyond its origins or administrability, some critics have questioned the
basic premise of the reasonable expectations of privacy test—the extent to
which protecting “privacy” gives the Court traction in upholding the values
at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Commentators dispute whether it is
truly possible to agree on the limits of privacy.399 They protest that the
shifting social norms of the digital age, frequently requiring us to entrust our
most intimate details to corporations and strangers alike, have undercut any
colorable expectations of privacy from the state.400 They object that the Court’s
privacy-centric precedent has left it indifferent to more pressing categories of
police misconduct: violence in effectuating searches or seizures,401 pretextual stops
targeting marginalized groups,402 and the epidemic of discriminatory investigation
and enforcement.403 To the extent privacy even deserves legal protection, they
debate whether courts or legislatures are best suited to that task.404
397 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Rubenfeld, supra note
19, at 104 (“The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of privacy. It guarantees—if its actual
words mean anything—a right of security.”).
398 See Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 106-07 (noting that privacy expectations can reflect “widespread
social norms drawn from outside the Fourth Amendment”); supra text accompanying notes 106–107.
399 See Pozen, supra note 324, at 225; Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1077-79; Solove, supra note 299, at 1088.
400 E.g., JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 8-9 (2007); SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, at 3, 10;
Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1085-86 (“By its very nature, our [online life] leaves a digital record, typically
one with multiple copies scattered across a series of computer servers”); see also Rubenfeld, supra note
19, at 118 (“[The Fourth Amendment] will see its role inevitably shrinking as information technology
expands.”). In light of the growing power of corporations holding individual data, many question
whether our most pressing risks to privacy still come from the state. See JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 107 (2012); ETZIONI, supra note 353, at 10-11; Daniel J. Solove,
Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2002).
401 See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1068.
402 Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment:
New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 719-30 (1998).
403 Sacharoff, supra note 300, at 1180. Scholars have also noted an inconsistency between the
Fourth Amendment’s concern with privacy and the vast scope of government intrusions sanctioned
by the regulatory state, see Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1017, and our national security apparatus, see Neil
M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937-41 (2013).
404 See Harris, supra note 163, at 931; Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice
System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111
MICH. L. REV. 485, 488-90 (2013). See generally Baude & Stern, supra note 117.
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In light of these shortcomings, many have suggested that the “reasonable
expectations of privacy” framework is best retired in favor of a new alternative.
Bill Stuntz famously urged courts to recalibrate the Fourth Amendment around
the problem of police violence, focusing primarily on the threat of intimidation
or coercion by the state.405 Scott Sundby has proposed that Fourth Amendment
rules reflect a principle of mutual trust between government and citizen: the
presumption that individuals voluntarily behave in a lawful fashion.406 These
suggestions have their own drawbacks, whether in terms of their
administrability407 or their ability to rein in the full range of police
misconduct—especially today, when many troubling state intrusions are
accomplished without violence of any kind.408 Accordingly, some commentators
have sought a more generalizable principle, aimed especially at preserving Fourth
Amendment protections in the digital age. Adopting different terminologies but
a similar Millian philosophy, Jed Rubenfeld and David Sklansky have argued that
the Fourth Amendment is best seen as protecting some site of personal
autonomy: a right of “personal security”409 or a “zone of refuge,”410 where
individuals can retreat from public scrutiny and indulge in uninhibited personal,
intellectual, and creative growth. Protecting an intrinsic right to a life away from
public scrutiny—and recalling the Fourth Amendment’s origins as a safeguard of
political dissent—these principles aim to provide a more resilient limitation
against state intrusion in a world of shifting interpersonal norms.
The moralistic strain that has invaded the Katz framework over the past decades
provides an additional reason to revisit the doctrine. The contrarian nature of the
Court’s privacy-based Fourth Amendment analysis, frequently departing from our
publicly held understandings of privacy itself, reveals the extent to which the
Court’s privacy doctrine has failed on its own terms. As rights-restrictive cases like
Riley, Carter, and Jacobsen suggest, the limitations of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment caselaw in the past decades do not simply reflect the Court’s choice of
privacy over more trenchant categories of analysis, or the increasingly vulnerable
status of privacy norms in the digital age. They also reflect the paucity of the
Court’s underlying vision of privacy: its failure to theorize privacy consistently with
our shared cultural understandings of that term, as a retreat from the pressures of
communitarian judgment. This paucity goes beyond a disagreement over the
405
406
407

See Stuntz, supra note 7.
See Sundby, supra note 19.
For instance, Sundby’s suggestion that a government action would qualify as a search whenever it is
“inconsistent with trusting the citizenry to behave in a lawful and responsible fashion,” id. at 1791, would seem
to encompass all investigative acts undertaken by the state, beyond perhaps spotting evidence in plain view.
408 Published over twenty years ago, Stuntz’s proposal—while certainly pinpointing a core
category of police abuses—is essentially blind to the growing problems of government surveillance
and data collection at the heart of many difficult Fourth Amendment questions today.
409 Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 128.
410 Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1115-16.
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proper definition of privacy—the Court’s penchant for, say, emphasizing
“informational” privacy over a more dignitarian approach. It reveals a basic
blindness to the underlying value of privacy, informational or otherwise. And that
paucity is not, despite the acute stresses of the digital age, a recent development,
reflecting the Court’s failure to update its privacy norms to our novel technological
terrain. It is a longstanding feature of the Court’s reasonable expectations of privacy
jurisprudence. The weaknesses of the Court’s privacy-based Fourth Amendment
over the past decades, in short, are both broader and deeper than typically
acknowledged—and they have often arisen despite, not because, of the Court’s the
choice of “privacy” as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.
If the Court’s impoverished vision of Fourth Amendment privacy exacerbates
the limitations of that conceptual framework, however, it also casts a shadow over
the alternative principles proposed by commentators in recent years—especially
those who hope to resurrect the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard of
individuality and expressive freedom. Recognizing the contrarian vision of
privacy at the heart of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine suggests that the
Court’s current departure from a liberal, rights-expansive jurisprudence is hardly
inherent in the concept of privacy itself. Privacy, including informational privacy,
is far from agnostic to the importance of moral autonomy, unorthodoxy, and
retreat. If the Court in the past decades has sometimes seemed to compromise
such values, protecting not the individual’s right to break from social convention
but only to indulge in conventionally valued acts, it is not because the Court has
lacked a conceptual framework that embraces those principles. It is because the
Court has simply not shown itself interested in protecting them.
There may thus be something optimistic in suggesting that the Court
recenter its Fourth Amendment doctrine around a more intrinsically
individualistic or autonomy-based framework, whether security, refuge, or
anything else. If the Court has frequently failed to respect liberal values in
allotting individual entitlements to privacy, it unclear why it would take a more
expansive approach in protecting these latter principles—principles that are, as
Sklansky notes, better envisioned as metonyms for than alternatives to privacy
itself.411 This is not to suggest that we should abandon all hope of reforming the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to embrace a more expansive view of
private life. But it is to suggest that reform will entail a heavier lift, not only
replacing Fourth Amendment privacy with a framework grounded in classically
liberal values of self-definition and retreat, but also redressing the underlying
moral commitments that have sometimes pushed the Court against those values.
411 See Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1113. Notably, Rubenfeld himself imagines courts applying
his security-based framework—ostensibly concerned with protecting the right of autonomy and
self-definition—through overtly subjective judgments about which activities, in his view, make
“personal life . . . imaginable.” Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 132.
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These comments represent only some preliminary speculation for such a
project, and this Article certainly cannot pretend to resolve the nuances of
crafting such a framework. To some, the rise of Fourth Amendment moralism
might support conceptual paradigms that exclude considerations of private
life altogether—something analogous to Stuntz’s emphasis on violence, with
its focus on the inherent pathologies of police conduct.412 To others, it may
simply call for greater diligence in guarding the liberal heart of the Fourth
Amendment, erecting a Fourth Amendment framework that is not only
rhetorically suffused with liberal values of unorthodoxy and individualism,
but that imbeds those values into the doctrinal inquiry itself.
Regardless, any attempts to retheorize the Fourth Amendment around the
principles of unorthodoxy, self-definition, and retreat must take into account the
Court’s demonstrable resistance, over the past five decades, to vindicating these
liberal values—even where we might most expect it do so, in a procedural provision
ostensibly blind to an individual’s conduct, that protects the “innocent and guilty
alike.” To the extent that we are ready to take up the larger project of rethinking
the Fourth Amendment for an increasingly public age, the under-recognized
moralism of the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy test identifies an additional
consideration to bear in mind: the urgency, and difficulty, of adopting a framework
that truly holds the Court accountable to classically liberal or individualist ideals.
CONCLUSION: HAS THERE BEEN A RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
Typically seen as a procedural provision blind to a defendant’s conduct in
any case, the Fourth Amendment over the past five decades has in fact
developed a deeply substantive dimension. Ever since the Court recentered
Fourth Amendment protections around one’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” it has consistently tied Fourth Amendment rights to its moral
appraisal of the defendant’s conduct at the time of the search. As in its
substantive privacy jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause, the Court
has afforded greater Fourth Amendment protections to individuals engaged
in conventionally valued social activities, privileging domesticity and other
“intimate” relationships over more individualistic or unorthodox pursuits.
And in some cases, it has sanctioned an explicitly retrospective analysis of the
actions for which Fourth Amendment privacy is claimed.
The Court’s moralistic assessment of Fourth Amendment privacy rights is
a vexing development, departing from the Fourth Amendment’s text, clashing
with its history and purposes, and obstructing its practical operation as a shield
against unreasonable police tactics. And that development flies against
prevailing understandings of privacy, as a necessary zone of refuge from the
412

Cf. supra text accompanying note 406.
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pressures and expectations of mainstream society. Especially in the electronic
age, as digital technologies vastly expand the police’s ability to parse categories
of personal data, the Court must take steps to cabin its moralistic privacy-based
jurisprudence, restoring a richer view of the Fourth Amendment as protecting
more individualist forms of intellectual, creative, and expressive autonomy.
Beyond the question of Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Court’s
moralistic assessment of reasonable expectations of privacy also invites us to
consider a broader question—an adequate answer to which, once more, is
beyond the scope of this Article. For more than simply highlighting the Fourth
Amendment’s underappreciated contiguities with the Due Process Clause, the
rise of Fourth Amendment moralism demonstrates the sheer pervasiveness of
the Court’s moralistic vision of privacy, spilling past substantive due process
and invading even a quintessentially procedural safeguard against the state.
Starting in the 1960s, the story goes, the Supreme Court infused multiple
doctrinal frameworks with the rhetoric of “privacy”—a value defended in those
same years as a retreat from the judgment, pressures, and expectations of society.
Yet the Court’s privacy doctrines have rarely worked to shield the individual against
the weight of social judgment. To be sure, there is the species of First Amendment
privacy recognized in Stanley, as well as the liberal strand of substantive due process
embodied in Roe and Eisenstadt, which shield individuals’ sexual desires or
procreative decisions against the moral condemnation of the state. Most of the
Court’s privacy cases, however, have taken a far thinner view, recognizing and
rewarding the Court’s own views of desirable social arrangements. Thus, the right
of domestic privacy does not protect an individual’s autonomy in assembling her
household, but only the established value of the family.413 The sexual privacy
emerging from Griswold and Lawrence does not defend an individual’s preferred
modes of sexual fulfillment, but only her right to pursue “enduring bonds.”414 And
even the private zone protected by the Fourth Amendment—that last, procedural
bastion of individual liberty—frequently privileges spaces housing “intimate” or
otherwise “valuable” social customs. One may claim a legitimate expectation of
privacy for meaningful social visits, but not for commercial exchanges; for domestic
pursuits, but not the mixing of chemicals or the use of drugs; for “intimate”
interpersonal activities, but not the cultivation of crops or personal hobbies.
This is a vision of privacy less as a shield from communitarian judgment
than as the consequence of that judgment. The zone it demarcates may certainly
be “private,” in the sense that it is removed from direct scrutiny or interference
413 Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) (upholding an ordinance limiting the
number of unrelated individuals who may live together in a home), with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (invalidating an ordinance limiting cohabitation by non-nuclear family members).
414 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 567 (2003).
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by the state. But it has little to do with what most of us would see as the value
of privacy. Certainly, it is far afield from the intellectual and spiritual autonomy
Justice Brandeis extolled as “the right most valued by civilized men.”415
Like the Court’s moralistic analysis, the contemporary debate about the value
of privacy extends far beyond the question of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Whether discussing the state’s growing incursions on private data416 or the proper
trade-off between privacy and security,417 corporations’ duties of privacy to their
consumers418 or their duties to cooperate with law enforcement,419 the use of
personal data by advertisers,420 protections for employees’ private activities,421 or
the public’s appetite for the disclosure of intimate personal details as a mode of
entertainment,422 we are surrounded by delicate and often difficult disputes about
the proper boundaries between personal and public life.
As we continue to debate the extent to which our legal system can and should
protect privacy—the extent, in essence, that we value privacy as a society—it
might be troubling to recognize that our Constitution has never, truly, protected
a right of privacy that we would recognize as such. Acknowledging the paucity
of those protections might diminish our commitment to privacy, encouraging or
justifying us in embracing privacy losses in exchange for other public interests.
Or it might push to double our commitment to privacy as an axis of our
democratic society—and to do a better job of protecting it going forward. If,
415
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echoing the Court’s own rhetoric of the past century, we embrace privacy as
a “unique value[] of our civilization,”423 then we should demand some genuine
protection for that sacred zone: a freedom that is not conditioned on but
allows some reprieve from the weight of social judgment.
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